



Negotiating and Drafting International
Distribution, Agency, and
Representative Agreements: The
United States Exporter's Perspectivet
I. Introduction
1. DEVELOPING A UNITED STATES EXPORTER'S PERSPECTIVE
TO INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION
Legal issues touching upon the appointment, conduct, and termination
of international distributorship, agency, and representative arrangements
are a regular part of the diet of international practitioners and courts. For
example, the Federal Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of Germany
recently reaffirmed that an agent who acts as a sales representative cannot
be terminated without compensation even when the termination comes
as a necessary incident of the reorganization of the principal's enterprise.1
*Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio.
**Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, Ohio.
fThe Editorial Reviewer for this article is Kevin M. Harris.
The law cited herein is as available to the authors at December 1, 1986.
1. Judgment of January 30, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof, Karlsruhe, [BGH], W. Ger. I ZR
185/83, noted in Bus. L. BRIEF (Financial Times) June 1986, at 15.
Traditionally, discussion of international sales through independent local intermediaries
commences with definitions of key terms such as "distributor," "agent"and "representa-
tive." The authors have however left the detailed definitional issues until Part 1I of this
article preferring to review necessarily prior international business and practical contracting
issues first.
In their combined experience, the authors have encountered a sargasso sea of labels for
independent local intermediaries. As a practical matter, the two key roles are as follows:
(I) the "agent," who usually does not bind his principal to a third party, seldom takes
custody of goods, and contracts obligations towards only one party, his principal, the
exporter; and (2) the "distributor,"who sells on his own account and often does take custody
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In this case the principal suffered substantial losses through 1979 and two
months later terminated the agreement with its sales representative upon
approximately twenty days' notice. The sales representative claimed dam-
ages for failure to observe the ambiguous contractual notice period, and
also compensation for loss of continued business with its customers. The
sales representative won at trial, but was awarded lower damages than
claimed. The principal appealed. The Federal Supreme Court agreed with
the intermediate appellate court that a principal is free to reorganize his
business as necessary, but insisted that the principal may terminate the
agency agreement without proper notice only if such termination would
be justified by consideration of the reasonable business interests of both
the principal and the agent. The principal's corporate reorganization did
not, of itself, justify termination without proper notice, particularly if the
reorganization had been under consideration for a significant period of
time. Consequently, the sales representative was entitled to compensation
for its loss of potential business.
One can freely speculate how much litigation cost (as well as the damage
award) could have been saved by the principal, had the principal not
appointed an agent but rather established a distributorship. Also, the
agency agreement failed to set forth a formula for determining appropriate
consequences upon termination. Finally, the contract did not expressly
authorize continued sales of the product by the principal after termination.
It is no surprise that the appointment and the termination are two of
the most regulated, and most studied, areas of international agency and
distributorship law.2 There is also voluminous English language litera-
of goods. The distributor contracts obligations with both the exporter, from whom the
distributor buys, and with the purchaser, to whom the distributor sells. When a distributor
rather than an agent acts, the exporter does not contract with the foreign purchaser.
2. See e.g., Bauman, International Sales Representation and Distributorship Agreements,
4 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 141 (1979); Johnson, International Distributorship and
Agency Arrangements, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION: NEGOTIATING AND
DRAFTING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 199 (1966); King, Legal Aspects of
Appointment and Termination of Foreign Distributors and Representatives, 17 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 91 (1985); Lando, The Commercial Agent in European Law, 1965 J. Bus. L.
179, 374, reprinted in 1966 J. Bus. L. 82; Muller-Freienfels, Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMp.
L. 165 (1967); Muller-Freienfels, Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: Power of Agency
and Commercial Certainty (pts. I-IV), 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 341 (1964); Puelinckx &
Tielemans, The Termination of Agency and Distributorship Agreements: A Comparative
Survey, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 452 (1981); Saltoun & Spudis, International Distribution
and Sales Agency Agreements: Practical Guidelines for U.S Exporters, 38 Bus. LAW. 883
(1983); Schmitthof, Agency in International Trade, 129 RECEUIL DES COURS 115 (1970-1);
Vanderhaeghe & Jones, Current Developments in European Agency Law, 12 INT'L LAW.
671 (1978). For an excellent discussion of United States distributorships gone sour and the
resultant litigation issues, see Faruki, The Defense of Terminated Dealer Litigation: A Survey
of Legal and Strategic Considerations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (1985).
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ture on specific countries' problems in the international representation
area.
3
The following discussion will not dwell upon the pathological mire of
agencies and distributorships gone wrong, but instead will focus on the
international corporate lawyer's role at the negotiation and drafting stages
of these important relationships. The case just outlined simply serves to
highlight the unfortunate consequences of insufficient or ineffective legal
counseling at the time when international representation arrangements are
created.
Before approaching various legal issues, it is important to analyze cer-
tain of the business considerations that might dictate one form of repre-
sentative arrangement over another, and then to stress some of the elements
of negotiating and drafting that set off international agreements from their
domestic counterparts. The items listed in the next section are by no
means exhaustive, but should provide a good basis to assure that critical




Prior to the involvement of any lawyers, it should be expected that the
business executive in charge of any particular arrangement has carefully
3. See, e.g., Antonetti, Puerto Rico's Dealer's Act Fourteen Years Later, 83 COM. L.J.
453 (1978); Baker, Legal Problems of United States Exporters Selling in France, 14 INT'L
LAW. 79 (1980); Carbonneau, Exclusive Distributorship Agreements in French Law, 28 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 91 (1979); Cartwright, The New Saudi Commercial Agencies Regulation, 16
INT'L LAW. 443 (1982); Cartwright & Hamza, The SaudiArabian Service Agents Regulation,
34 Bus. LAW. 475 (1979); Finkelstein, Legislative and Judicial Regulation of Exclusive
Distribution Agreements in France, 15 INT'L LAW. 539 (1981); Hayward, Jurisdiction Under
the Belgian Law on Termination of Exclusive Distributors: An Exercise in Conflicts of Law
and Jurisdiction, 14 INT'L LAW. 128 (1980); Homsy, Agency Law in the Arabian Peninsula
and North Africa, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 296 (1983); Jones, Practical Aspects of
Commercial Agency and Distribution Agreements in the European Community, 6 INT'L
LAW. 107 (1972); Juncadella, Agency, Distribution and Representation Contracts in Central
America and Panama, 6 LAW. AMERICAS 35 (1974); Leigh & Guy, Exclusive Agency Agree-
ments in the EEC, I EUR. L. REV. 282 (1976); Lowden, The Negotiation and Drafting of
Commercial Sales Agreements in East Europe, 29 Bus. LAW. 845 (1974); Meyer, Terminating
Sales Arrangements in West Germany, 7 TEX. INT'L L.J. 233 (1972); Sales, Termination of
Sales Agents and Distributors in France, 17 INT'L LAW. 741 (1983); Shamma & Morrison,
The Use of Local Representatives in Saudi Arabia, II INT'L LAW. 453 (1977); Simons,
Termination of Sales Agents and Distributors in Belgium, 17 INT'L LAW. 752 (1983); Sunt,
Distribution Agreements under Belgian Law, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1986, at 21; Swacker,
Dealer and Agent Relations: Avoidance of Common Pitfalls in DOING BUSINESS IN LATIN
AMERICA 95 (S. Stairs ed. 1985); Taylor & Weissman, Middle East Agency Law Survey, 14
INT'L LAW. 331 (1980); Vorbrugg & Mahler, Agency and Distributorship Agreements under
German Law, 19 INT'L LAW. 607 (1985).
4. See e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 202.
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canvassed the relevant market through appropriate surveys and studies. 5
Thus, one should be able to assume that a demand for a particular product
in fact exists. While these assumptions are not unreasonable, we consider
it to be part of an effective international lawyer's role to assess diplo-
matically whether a client, before embarking on a costly international
expedition, has in fact taken into account the many facets of a sensible
foreign investment.
The Structure of the Proposed Investment
Aside from distributorship or agency relationships, the business ex-
ecutive should weigh the benefits and disadvantages of creating a per-
manent establishment overseas, of setting up branches or warehouses, of
possibly joint-venturing the manufacture or distribution of a particular
product (such as taking an equity position in the foreign representative's
entity), or of creating foreign subsidiaries. Many of the considerations for
an appropriate structure are naturally affected by legal and tax concerns.
The ultimate determining factor, however, should generally be the client's
long-term business objectives. Thus, one of the key questions we usually
ask our clients is what their business expectations and objectives are three,
five, and eight years down the road. Most of the time legal considerations
can be blended into each client's long-term business expectations.
The Foreign Representative
Assuming that, based on a consideration of all relevant factors, the
client has rejected the creation of a foreign branch or subsidiary, then the
next question is whether to appoint a distributor or an agent in the foreign
jurisdiction. Aside from the legal issues discussed throughout this article,
the client should consider:
1. The amount of control that it is desirable to exercise over the foreign
representative, and the client's own long-term objectives in any par-
ticular geographical market or area. The identification of a foreign
representative must generally be left for the client, although it may
be worthwhile to determine whether, subject to applicable antitrust
or competition laws, the client has considered the appointment of a
competitor or of one who markets complementary (as opposed to
competitive) products.
2. Issues of customer contacts, such as the desirability of reserving
direct sales by the manufacturer, whether generally or to specific
5. Comprehensive background on the foreign markets being approached can be found in
the Department of Commerce series Overseas Business Reports, which reviews the pros-
pects for American business abroad on a country-by-country basis.
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accounts. Is a local distributor in a better position to create favorable
impressions with the ultimate purchasers and the host country, and
thereby enhance the likelihood of success in a particular market? In
this connection the manufacturer should also consider whether to
grant the representative the right to appoint sub-representatives.
3. Strengths and weaknesses of the foreign representative's personnel,
including ability to promote the products and canvass the remaining
market, necessary technical training, and ability to service products
post-sale. When the proposed representative may not quite measure
up to the client's expectations, consideration should be given to the
representative's willingness and potential for recruiting needed per-
sonnel. Also, additional personnel may be required to expand the
market, and the client should consider the availability of such com-
petent personnel in the local labor market.
4. Complexity of the relevant product in view of local market condi-
tions, competence of the representative's personnel, and educational
stature of the ultimate consumers in the local market.
5. The financial capacity of the foreign representative. This criterion
is obviously key to whether the representative should be exclusive
or nonexclusive. Financial strength is often required to meet local
competition and store sufficient inventory to meet the fluctuating
demands of what it is hoped will be an expanding market. Also the
availability of local investment incentives should be considered.
6. The representative's enthusiasm and objectives for the future. Do
the objectives correspond to the manufacturer's expectations? If any
aspect of the representative's qualifications is questionable, the man-
ufacturer should assess the availability (present and future) of com-
petent alternative representatives.
7. The need for sophisticated machinery and equipment to service cus-
tomers' needs post-sale.
8. The desirability of strong intellectual property protections.
These are all matters that must be carefully weighed in deciding whether
to appoint a representative, an agent, or a distributor. A note of caution
is in order here. In their nationalism, many courts will strain to apply
their country's protective legislation to representative arrangements. Thus,
on the one hand a court might conclude that, irrespective of what a
representative is called, whether agent or distributor, the substance (trans-
lated most often into the degree of control exercised by the manufacturer
over the representative) and not the form of a particular relationship will
determine whether the representative is, in law, an agent or a distributor.
On the other hand, calling a distributor an agent in the agreement, as well
as in subsequent communications, may be sufficient for the representative,
although really a distributor, to seek and find protection under his coun-
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try's agency protective laws. Clearly, the exporter should be consistent
in all his communications with the representative.
Reasonableness and Fairness
Above all, in any long-term relationship, matters of fairness, reason-
ableness, and trust are the sine qua non of creating the necessary atmo-
sphere to give any project that involves other players the best possible
chance for success.
3. SOME BASIC COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW ISSUES
Some basic comparative contract law issues often surprise American
manufacturers seeking overseas distribution. For example, some civil law
countries require that an offer remain open for a statutory period of time
unless a different period is stipulated in the offer. In Mexico this period
is three days plus mail turnaround time. Acceptance issues can also sur-
prise. Most civil law countries put the time of acceptance not when the
offer is put in the post, deposited, or filed, but rather when it is received
by the offeror. 6 This and other comparative law problems can be reduced
partially by contractual incorporation of the United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods7 (the Sales Convention) and/or
INCOTERMS. 8 Note, for example, that while the Sales Convention fol-
lows the civil law rule that a contract is concluded when notice of accep-
tance reaches the offeror, it follows the common law rule that an offeror
may not revoke an offer once an acceptance has been dispatched. It is
important to point out, however, that unexpected dangers may be lurking
when the Sales Convention is incorporated by reference, although it can
be adopted privately as well as nationally. 9 Note should also be made of
the provision in article 16 that an offer will be deemed irrevocable if it is
reasonable for the offeree to rely on its being irrevocable and the offeree
acts in reliance on the offer, even if the offer does not contain language
indicating irrevocability.
6. See e.g., Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-Accep-
tance Doctrine, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1936).
7. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Apr. 10, 1980, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter
Sales Convention]. See generally J. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (1982); INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(DUBROVNIK LECTURES) (P. Sarcevic & P. Volken eds. 1986).
8. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS (2d ed. 1980).
9. The United States was the ninth nation to ratify the Convention on October 9, 1986.
That ratification became effective on December II, 1986, along with the ratification of Italy
and the accession of the People's Republic of China. The Convention takes effect in United
States law, January 1, 1988. It now seems likely that a great many countries will ratify.
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The Sales Convention represents the sum total of lengthy negotiations
between sixty-two countries, and as a result incorporates a great number
of common as well as civil law concepts. As a consensus document, it
disguises as many conflicts of legal methodology as it resolves conflicts
of substantive law. Thus, it is a potential trap for the unwary. Furthermore,
the Sales Convention does not apply to the sale of services or an arrange-
ment in which services play a preponderant role over the sale of goods,
and contains no Statute of Frauds (thus oral agreements are as enforceable
as written ones)' 0 and no requirement for consideration (although the
offerer can, of course, require consideration and a written agreement in
the terms of the offer). American lawyers unfamiliar with civil law con-
cepts or with the terms of the Sales Convention should not be surprised
that disputes might not necessarily be resolved as they would be under
common law notions. Certainly, the Sales Convention, if incorporated
into a particular offer, is likely to result in the formation of fewer contracts
because the Sales Convention requires the terms of an acceptance to
conform more strictly to the terms of the offer, except where alterations
are not material.II Once the Sales Convention becomes effective, great
care must be exercised to explicitly contract out of the Sales Convention
in whole or in part, if that be desired, 12 since the Sales Convention applies
by its terms to contracts between two parties who have places of business
in different states party to the Sales Convention 13 or where the conflict
of law rules of a state lead to the law of a state party to the Sales
Convention. 14
In respect of the incorporation of INCOTERMS, the draftsman must, of
course, be aware that INCOTERMS deals principally with the apportion-
10. Sales Convention, supra note 7, art. 1I.
11. Id. art. 19; cf. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1982). Although, on this point, the Sales Convention
closely parallels the legal position in common law countries other than the United States.
12. Sales Convention, supra note 7, art. 6.
13. Id. art. l(l)(a). Under the Sales Convention, parties are free to choose to exclude
the applicability of the Convention or any part thereof. Article 6, however, requires that
they must do so expressly. In comparison, under U.C.C § 1-201(3) (1982) such an agreement
to derogate from its mandate can be implied.
14. Sales Convention, supra note 7, art. l(l)(b). States, in adopting the Sales Convention,
may reserve against the applicability of art. l(1)(b) to avoid the inadvertent applicability of
the Convention. In accordance with art. 95, the United States did adopt a reservation against
the applicability of art. l(1)(b). Therefore, the Sales Convention can only apply to United
States parties when their foreign contracting partner is a national of another Sales Con-
vention country. See Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales-the 1980 U.N. Con-
vention, in 1984 ASIAN PACIFIC REGIONAL TRADE LAW SEMINAR 181, 185-90; Pelichet, The
Hague Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, id. at 299.
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ment of risk of loss of goods in transit, the passage of title to the goods,
and the costs of transportation, custom duties, and insurance. An inter-
national contract for the sale of goods should contain many more provi-
sions than would be supplied by the mere incorporation of INCOTERMS.
Moreover, returning to comparative law issues, civil law systems gen-
erally do not accommodate the concept of an agent acting for an undis-
closed principal. On the other hand, under common law notions a duly
authorized agent (or one with the requisite apparent authority) may close
a contract between principal and third party even though the third party
is unaware of the identity of the principal. The agent can thereby bind
the principal and third party, but not itself. In civil law systems the same
facts have different legal consequences. Two separate, independent con-
tracts exist. The agent and third party bind each other, while the contract
between the agent and its principal remains apart. There is no contract
between the principal and third party. Many continental commission agents
operate this way. To tie the principal and third party contractually, a
separate assignment is needed.15 The agent and third party must specif-
ically contract to assign rights to the principal to enforce the arrangement
if and when the principal is disclosed.16
Implied warranties in civil law systems tend to be somewhat broader
than under the common law. If warranties of merchantability and fitness
for purpose are to be given, it should be recognized that these warranty
terms are terms of art within the framework of national systems and have
no generic international meaning. Consequently, contractual choice of law
will have a significant impact on the warranties being given.
Force majeure is another doctrine that is quite differently interpreted
under various national legal systems. Parties should not incorporate force
majeure as a presumably understood term in their contracts. Both the
acceptable impediments, and consequences upon the existence and/or
certification of such impediments, should be spelled out line by line. A
clause that gives parties discretion to claim force majeure may even be
unenforceable under some civilian codes. In Brazil, for example, definite
limits, both substantive and procedural, are conditions of enforceability. 17
15. The exterior relationship between principal and agent on the one side and the third
party on the other is the focus of the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of
Goods, done at Geneva, Feb. 17, 1983, reprinted in 22 1.L.M. 246 (1983) (draft prepared by
the International Institute for the Unification of Private International Law (UNIDROIT)).
See Evans, The Geneva Convention on Agency in the International Sale of(Goods, in 1984
ASIAN PACIFIC REGIONAL TRADE LAW SEMINAR 250. Adoption of the Convention is under
consideration by a number of countries, particularly as the Convention is designed to
supplement the Sales Convention.
16. Accord Schmitthof, supra note 2, at 140.
17. Brazil - C6DIGO CIVIL [C.C.], arts. 115 & 1125; see de Carvalho & Powers, Drafting
Contracts under Brazilian Law: A Practical Guide to Enforceability, 14 INT'L LAW. 115,
120 (1980).
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Remedy issues are also impacted by the choice of law and by the choice
of forum. Many legal systems consider remedy issues to be procedural
issues governed by the law of the forum rather than the substantive law
of the contract. Consequently, civil law concepts of damages, rescission
and restitution need to be examined. Continental legal systems often pre-
fer specific performance over damages, whereas common law systems
have a preference for granting damages as the more appropriate remedy
in most cases.
Irrespective of the foregoing, in the practical trading world of the west-
ern hemisphere (and significant portions of other hemispheres as well)
the course of international dealings and usages of trade often supply the
requisite ingredients to supply missing terms or to assure the fair reso-
lution of disputes as to contractual interpretation. 18 Thus, despite the
differences in the numerous legal systems throughout the world, inter-
national usage of trade provides some comfort against wholly unexpected
and undesirable consequences. The clearly preferred alternative, of course,
is to spell out all important terms of a contractual relationship to avoid
the incorporation of unanticipated usages of trade.
4. CLARITY AND PRECISION IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
While the laws in the contracting parties' respective countries may, on
some occasions, be similar, their cultural and business backgrounds may
lead them to interpret the same words differently. Spelling out definitional
issues reduces the risk that any differences of interpretation will lead to
difficulties down the line.
One cannot stress enough the need for clarity and precision in drafting
documents for use in international transactions. International litigation or
arbitration seldom provides a satisfactory solution to contractual disputes.
Clarity and precision lead to predictability, which in turn leads to effective
dispute prevention in all but the most egregious cases. Even basic con-
cepts should be spelled out so that the contracting parties are all the more
certain to have the same understanding and interpretation of contractual
terms. The "meeting of the minds" must clearly be set forth at the outset
even if certain issues are rather painful or difficult to raise, negotiate, or
express. The lawyer's role here can be invaluable in alerting the parties
to potential pitfalls or oversights, and then precisely recording the parties'
intentions on paper. If the intentions are clearly set forth, subsequent
disputes are likely to be resolved within the four corners of the agreement.
If the agreement is ambiguous, much extrinsic evidence may need to be
produced to determine the parties' intentions. 19 The needed extrinsic
18. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207 (1982); Sales Convention, art. 9.
19. "[I]t is their intention as it existed at the time the contract was executed which must
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evidence is often unavailable after several years of a good relationship.
5. CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM
As the network of trading nations becomes more complex, there is a
growing trend towards respecting exclusive choices of law and of forum
in contracts, and the invocation of such a clause creates a certain level
of predictability to dispute resolution problems in international con-
tracts.20 From a psychological perspective, it has often proven the case
that when contractual provisions are clear and unambiguous, and there-
fore the parties' obligations predictable in all respects, disputes will not
arise because this high level of predictability will lead parties to accept
their responsibilities (no matter how painful subsequent circumstances)
or find alternative amicable resolutions. For those disputes that do require
adjudication, however, parties should know in advance what law will apply
to settle their differences, and which forum will be applying that law.
The governing law clause should include a provision stating a choice
of law and also a choice of forum, and should explicitly provide that these
choices are exclusive. Nonexclusive choices, and clauses silent as to
exclusivity, risk being treated by courts as merely hortatory. They import
less predictability into the contractual dispute resolution process than
exclusive choices. Parties should be advised to select the law of a country,
state, or province that has substantial contact with the agreement and its
performance. This increases the chance that the clause will be effective. 2 1
It may also be wise to arrange for the agreement to be signed by the
United States exporter in the jurisdiction whose law is to govern, after it
has first been signed by the foreign representative. Nevertheless, on issues
control rather than any subsequent intention tailored to complement an individual's posture
once an agreement has gone sour." New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power
Generation & Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
20. See, e.g., Rome Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19,
1980, signed as of April 1, 1983, by Belgium, Denmark, France (ratified), Ireland, (Italy),
Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany, 3 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 6311 (1980); see generally Nanda, Forum-Selection and Choice-of-Law-Clauses in
International Contracts in THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACrIONS § 8.02(l)(e)
(1981); Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial
Agreements, 3 INT'L TRADE L.J. 311 (1978).
21. Under Uniform Commercial Code principles, contracting parties are free to choose
the law of a particular jurisdiction to govern their relationship, provided the transaction
bears a reasonable relation to the selected state. U.C.C. § 1-105(1982). The Sales Convention
contains no such requirement. It will apply irrespective of the lack of any nexus if its
jurisdictional requirements are met. Indeed, for contracts between nationals of Sales Con-
vention countries, a selection of either nation's law (or, in a federal construct, of the law
of an internal state or province) will invoke the Sales Convention. If the contracting parties
desire to exclude applicability of the Sales Convention, they must do so expressly.
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of important public policy, foreign courts often assert jurisdiction. 22 The
only preventive medicine available for unwelcome assertions of jurisdic-
tion is to prepare a balanced and fair construct for the representation and
thus limit, as far as practicable, the scope of judicial attack.
In almost all common law jurisdictions, both choice of law and choice
of forum clauses will be respected. Western European nations also gen-
erally take a permissive approach to contractual choices of law and forum. 23
Still, a great many nations such as Argentina, Colombia, and Costa Rica
adopt a very nationalistic approach to jurisdiction. The Belgian distrib-
utorship law24 and the Costa Rican agency law25 exemplify nationalistic
approaches. Except for necessary compliance with the European Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, 26 disputes concerning the termination of Belgian
distributors will be resolved by the Belgian courts under Belgian law
regardless of any choice of forum, choice of law, or preference for arbi-
tration exhibited in the contract appointing the distributor.
Regardless of whether the foreign jurisdiction presently recognizes and
respects choices of law and forum, both clauses should be included in
foreign representation agreements. Where these clauses exist, and exclu-
sively select a law other than the law that was applied, or a forum other
than the forum that heard the dispute, United States courts might be
persuaded not to recognize and enforce judgments against United States
22. For example, many states do not permit the exclusion of distributor/agent protective
laws. If a distributor/agent is appointed in such ajurisdiction, the distributor/agent protective
laws of that jurisdiction apply irrespective of a contractual provision selecting the laws of
another jurisdiction more favorable to the exporter. See infra text Part III.
23. E.g., Judgment of Sept. 23, 1971, BGH 8th civ. sen., W. Ger., 57 BGHZ 72, 75;
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 25 (Italy); Williams, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable
to Contractual Obligations, 35 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1 (1986); Zaphiriou, supra note 20, at
315-16.
24. Belgian Law of July 27, 1961, on the Unilateral Termination of Exclusive Distribu-
torship Agreements of Indefinite Duration, Moniteur Beige, Oct. 5, 1961, as amended by
Law of Apr. 13, 1971, Moniteur Beige, Apr. 21, 1971, art. 6.
25. Costa Rica Law No. 6209 of Feb. 24, 1978, as amended by Executive Decree No.
8599 of May 5, 1978, art. 7; accord Puerto Rico Civil and Commercial Codes, as supple-
mented by Act No. 75 of June 24, 1964, amended by Act No. 104 of June 28, 1965, as
amended by Act No. 105 of June 23, 1966, P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 10, §§ 278-278(d) (1975 &
Supp. 1985); see also Pan Am Computer Corp. v. Data General Corp., 467 F. Supp. 969
(D.PR. 1979) (the court rejected the plaintiff's choice of law in derogation of the protection
in Puerto Rico's dealership statute).
26. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, opened for signature Sept. 27, 1968, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 299) 32
(1972) (entered into force Feb. i, 1973), as amended to accommodate the accessions of new
member states, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 304) 77 (1978), Denmark-Ireland-United King-
dom, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 388) 1 (1982), Greece (Spain and Portugal are presently
arranging their accessions), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 8 (1979), 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
6003.
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exporters. 27 This helps only United States exporters whose attachable
assets are located solely within the United States. When a foreign judg-
ment can be satisfied from moneys due from a foreign representative this
precaution is of no real value, because such moneys constitute assets in
a foreign jurisdiction that are clearly attachable.
To strengthen choice of law and forum provisions, United States ex-
porters should insist that their foreign representatives submit to the ju-
risdiction of the courts in one of the states of the United States. 28 Such
submission clauses are difficult to negotiate, but are useful in obtaining
judgments in the selected forum, with the objective of obtaining registra-
tion and enforcement against the foreign representative in the foreign
representative's country.
6. CHOICE OF LANGUAGE AND CONTINUING COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES
International agreements are very often translated into two or more
languages. Therefore it is crucial to provide explicitly which language
version of the contract should control irrespective of subsequent trans-
lations and reliance by the parties on such translations. Furthermore,
international agreements should adopt an explicit controlling language for
future communication, especially where more than one language is apt to
be used. Assuring future effective communication and information ex-
change will not only avoid unnecessary disputes, but more importantly,
will help to cement a valuable business relationship. Personnel may change,
and replacement personnel may have different language facilities. If any
doubt exists between the parties as to the best mode of communication,
disputes on more substantive issues also are sure to occur.
In making a choice of language, the language selected should be the
language of the forum selected in the choice of forum clause. Common
sense may seem to require this choice, but even advanced western Eu-
ropean courts may misinterpret an English language contract in favor of
the European representative. If English is used as the language of contract,
the forum selected should be an English-speaking jurisdiction.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 105, 117 (1964); UNIFORM FOR-
EIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 417 (1980 & Supp. 1986). See
generally Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign
Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW. 425 (1982); Juenger, Federalism: Judicial Jurisdiction in the
United States and in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195
(1984).
28. See, e.g., N.Y. Clv. PRAC. L. & R. § 327 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987). Since 1984
New York's forum of convenience rule permits parties to big commercial contracts for a
consideration of at least $250,000 to choose New York law irrespective of the nexus of the
transaction to New York for controversies of more than $1 million.
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Notice clauses also should reflect the customary means of communi-
cation between countries. Between, say, Japan and the United States, the
first class airmail is fairly efficient and a notice clause can simply be
permissive, although we would not recommend it. Where the mail is
unreliable, for example, in Australia and in Canada, the notice clause
should deem that notice has been given after the lapsing of a mutually
agreeable time period.
7. CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES
A representative should undertake not to disclose, and to prevent its
employees, assignees, subcontractors, or agents from disclosing, any con-
fidential information acquired during the course of its relationship with
the exporter, and for a reasonable time period afterwards. It is imperative
that this clause explicitly state that it is to survive the termination of the
agreement. In many developing countries, such as Peru, Colombia, Ven-
ezuela, and the other members of the Andean Pact, confidentiality clauses
may be ineffective to the extent they may apply to technological infor-
mation that is deemed to have transferred outright to the foreign distributor
after the expiration of a specified number of years. 29
Establishing clear procedures for obtaining prior permission for making
disclosure to an affiliate or third party will work better than a constructive
knowledge standard. Where confidentiality is of real importance, as it so
often is, the parties' peace of mind is best secured by providing a clear,
workable procedure for the protection of confidentiality. The most effec-
tive procedures will change from case to case, depending on the parties'
relationship, the applicable law, the type of information to be kept con-
fidential, and the sophistication of the market.
8. GOOD FAITH
Good faith should be a concept that needs little discussion, but should
permeate every facet of an international commercial relationship. When
the selection of the foreign representative is the result of a careful and
meticulous process, the consistent application of the principle of good
faith in dealing with the foreign representative will translate directly into
desirable bottom line results ninety-nine percent of the time. Both the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Sales Convention, and for that matter
most local laws throughout the world, impose equitable conditions of good
29. For Andean Pact countries, this period may not be greater than that of the industrial
property rights granted by the respective law. See Decision 24 of the Commission of the
Cartagena Agreement, as amended, Andean Foreign Investment Code, Dec. 31, 1970, trans-
lated in I1 I.L.M. 126 (1972).
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faith in respect of the contractual performance, interpretation, and en-
forcement of contractual provisions. 30 Such desirable virtues and qualities
as a representative's loyalty, dedication, trust, and reliability can hardly
be expected in a commercial relationship devoid of good faith. Lawyers
who pride themselves in having pulled the wool over the other side's eyes
by having been able to slip a favorable and often totally one-sided and
overreaching provision past the "opponent," are not serving their client
well in his desires to cement a strong, long-lasting commercial relationship.
Even though the laws of the many jurisdictions in the free world differ
in some respects, there is a common underlying sense of justice and
fairness to all. The laws of the jurisdictions in the free world generally
reflect the mores of the particular society. The principle of good faith is
universally known and respected. If a client desires to do business in a
foreign jurisdiction, he should be willing to abide by the confines of the
applicable laws of that jurisdiction, unless the contracting parties, within
the confines of such laws, through good faith negotiations, exercise their
freedom of contract and subject their relationship to different laws or
agreed principles.
II. Appointing Foreign Representatives
9. AGENT, DISTRIBUTOR, OR REPRESENTATIVE:
SOME GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE CHOICES
The United States exporter selling abroad will inevitably be faced with
the decision of how to organize foreign sales. 31 In the context of this
discussion focusing on distribution, agency, and representation agree-
ments, the possibilities of setting up subsidiary operations or a represen-
tative office of the exporter in a foreign country will be left for another
day. Assume that our hypothetical exporter has decided that a local, well-
positioned third party will be hired to market the products in one or more
countries. The third party can be a distributor, commercial agent, com-
mission agent, or salesperson. We are not here concerned with salesper-
sons who are employees of the exporter, but now define each of the other
categories that do form the subject-matter of this article. As a preliminary
matter, the label or name by which a foreign representative is addressed
in the agreement, and in the course of the business relationship, is very
likely to impact a court's conclusion as to the legal relationship between
exporter and representative and the consequences of that relationship,
particularly where such labels lead to the application of representative
30. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1982); Sales Convention, supra note 7, art. 7(I).
31. See supra text section 2.
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protective laws. Bothersome as the distinctions between these labels are
to the business world, the labels used do incur different legal consequences
in different national legal systems. Although we make illustrative refer-
ences to foreign laws, we do not provide any overall country specific
analysis. Consequently, the following definitions have general utility, but
have no special claim to eminence.
Agents stand in an ongoing contractual relationship with their principal
to intermediate between the principal and third parties. In civil law juris-
dictions, we have noted that the commission agent does not bind an
undisclosed principal. Prudence dictates that agents receive either a pre-
cise and finite authority to bind the exporter as principal or a precise
denial of authority. Inter alia, the agent's mandate should specify whether
the agent is or is not authorized to receive payments. In Switzerland, for
example, agents may conclude contracts but do not deal with payments. 32
Note that a mandate to bind can result in the exporter being subject to
taxation in the foreign country. The exporter may be deemed to have a
"permanent establishment" there. 33
Agents may or may not be entrusted with the custody of an exporter's
products, but though they might take custody, the exporter remains the
owner of the products until the products are sold to a purchaser. Agents
who introduce buyers and sellers but take no part in contract formation
are mostly described either as brokers or representatives. 34 This article
discusses the foregoing categories of agents without distinction. 35 Their
separate features do not bear heavily on the negotiation and drafting of
international agency agreements. 36
A distributor, on the other hand, sells in his own name and for his own
account. Although the distributor has an ongoing contractual relationship
with the exporter, the distributor purchases goods from the exporter and
then resells them. The exporter will generally give the distributor an
32. SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT, CODE DES OBLIGATIONS, CODICE DELLE
OBLIGAZIONI [OR, Co, Co] art. 418e (Swiss).
33. See infra text section 26.
34. In the Middle East, "Sponsors" are used regularly. For a commission that is normally
less than the commission paid to a commercial agent, a sponsor legitimizes the presence of
a foreign seller in a particular country. Goods are imported in the name of the sponsor, but
business is conducted directly by the principal by means of a "commercial establishment"
bearing the name of the sponsor. Unlike the foreign commercial agent, the sponsor is not
really a part of a United States manufacturer's international marketing effort.
35. Some agents are known as del credere agents. Del credere agents act as surety to
the exporter by guaranteeing payment by the purchaser, but the del credere agent does not
contract for himself. Whereas the distributor is always liable for the price of the goods to
the exporter, the del credere agent is only liable if the ultimate purchaser does not pay.
36. Of course, if the principal is to remain undisclosed to purchasers, then the agency
agreement should make the agent a del credere agent; otherwise the exporter will have no
one against whom to enforce its unexecuted sales agreements.
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exclusive or preferential right in a particular market or geographical area,
although nonexclusive distributorships are quite common.
Among all these descriptions lies a basic distinction between agents
and distributors. Distributors independently contract for themselves for
the purpose of resale. 37 Distributorship agreements should contain terms
governing actual sales by the exporter to the distributor. We here distin-
guish agents, who incur no liability for themselves. Unlike distributors,
whose income is determined by independent price setting, the agent de-
pends for his income on a commission agreed to between himself and the
exporter. The distributor takes the risk of its customers not meeting their
bills, whereas the agent engages customers but leaves the risk of non-
payment with his principal, the exporter. Consequently, an agency agree-
ment, unlike a distributorship agreement, need not cover terms for sales
of goods since the sales contract is between the exporter and the ultimate
purchaser.
Perhaps most importantly, the distributor is an independent merchant,
whereas the agent operates according to the policies and under the su-
pervision of the principal. To a United States exporter wishing to control
and direct traffic in its goods overseas, an agency relationship makes good
business sense. The exporter, however, to whom such control over foreign
sales is of less importance, and who would prefer to avoid the attendant
business risks of acting as a principal in an overseas jurisdiction, may
prefer a distributorship. 38
The appointment clause should deal explicitly with the relationship
between the parties. For example, a distributorship may be exclusive or
nonexclusive, and the exporter may permit the distributor to appoint sub-
distributors to aid the distributor in the sales of the product in the territory.
The relationship between distributor and exporter must be clearly stated
and distinguished from the relationships between principal and agent, sales
representative, and employed salesperson if the parties are to seek the
legal benefits of distributorships. The agreement should be written to
reflect a distributor's independence.
Some operational differences also exist between agency and distribu-
torship. For example, a distributor has two sets of invoices, one for pur-
chase of goods from the exporter and one for resale to the ultimate customer.
The agent has one invoice that evidences a sale by the exporter to the
37. Distributor is a person who bears the economic risks of his selling activities. Notice
on Contracts for Exclusive Representations Concluded With Commercial Agents, Dec. 24,
1962, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 297 (1971); accord T.W. Lamb & Sons v. Goring Brick
Co., (1932) I K.B. 710, 716-22.
38. Taxation, antitrust, and intellectual property law issues also impact the choice between
agency and distributorship. These issues are generally beyond the scope of this article,
although we outline some important concerns in the concluding sections.
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ultimate purchaser. An agency agreement should specifically set out the
nature and extent of any agent's authority to bind the exporter and/or to
receive payment on the exporter's behalf, or, alternatively, the exporter's
right to accept or reject orders. In order to be effective in most jurisdic-
tions, the right to reject orders must be absolute. A reservation of the
right to reject orders should not be coupled with an agent's authority to
bind the principal in any respect. Such a coupling will inevitably be
confusing.
Of course, agencies and distributorships also have much in common as
noted in 1966 by the European Court of Justice in the Sarl and Grundig
case:
39
Plaintiff Grundig contends that the function of an exclusive distributorship
agreement in international trade is to create new competitive relationships by
enabling the producers of one country to take part in competition beyond that
country's national frontiers. In international trade, a producer selling abroad
must assign the task of distributing its products and defending its interests to
a responsible representative who knows his market and who has the necessary
means. Therein lie the meaning and the economic justification of the exclusive
distributorship which remain the same regardless of the legal form of the sales
organization chosen in each case by the producers, be it that of a branch, an
agency or an independent dealer. There is therefore no justification for treating
these various types of sales organization systems differently.
Notwithstanding the European Court of Justice's perspective, Euro-
pean statutory protection exists for agencies, but not distributorships, in
all countries except Belgium where the reserve is the case. For purposes
of this article, we distinguish between agents and distributorships as nec-
essary. Where the discussion applies to both agents and distributors, we
use the term "representative" to describe both major categories. Calling
a distributor an agent in Belgium with the hope of circumventing the
Belgian law for the protection of distributors is unlikely to be effective.
The reverse is true in jurisdictions that have adopted laws for the protec-
tion of agents. The degree of control over the representative that the
contract grants to the manufacturer and the degree of control actually
exercised, as well as the degree of authority granted to the representative
and the degree of authority actually exercised, will be the controlling
factors that determine a representative to be either a distributor or an
agent.
39. Etablissements Consten-Sarl and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission (Joined
Cases 56/64 and 58/64), [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder Court Decisions]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8046, at 7641. This case arose in France. Grundig forbade its
distributor, Consten, to sell outside France and similarly restricted each of its other European
distributors from selling outside each distributor's respective territories. The ECJ struck
down this "absolute territorial protection" as a violation of article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.
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10. REGISTRATION AND OTHER THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
As a preliminary matter, counsel should advise the United States ex-
porter that it may not always be possible to appoint a foreign represen-
tative. This is so especially in Arab countries. Algeria, for example,
prohibits the use of a representative.40 Direct selling must be undertaken,
and Algeria thereby assures that the United States exporter will be "doing
business" in Algeria if it wishes to sell there. This exposes the United
States exporter to the jurisdiction of the Algerian courts and to Algerian
taxation.
Other countries, particularly in the Middle East, forbid the use of a
foreign national as a representative. Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Indo-
nesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the
United Arab Emirates, and the Yemen Arab Republic apply this policy. 41
Socialist systems pursue a similar goal even more stringently. In some
Middle East countries the government may "unofficially" designate a
specific agent for the exporter in contracts with the government. Ob-
viously, this raises significant and difficult Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
issues. 42 Of the Middle East nations that require a representative to be a
local national, Saudi Arabia prohibits direct sales, and further requires
that a local representative be used to make all sales.4 3 In the other coun-
40. Algerian Law No. 78-02 of 1978 and Regulations of Circular No. 09-CAB of Mar. 27,
1982. Certain "nonintermediary" activities are permitted, e.g., (a) assemblers, general con-
tractors, combined export managers, (b) forwarders, (c) foreign export-import firms, and
(d) representatives dealing solely with Algerian-government agencies. Iraq, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia prevent the use of agents for government procurement to varying extents. In Iraq
the Minister of Trade must approve each agency relationship. Law No. 11/1983, art. 9.
Government bodies may not deal with agents without the Minister of Trade's permission.
41. For Abu Dhabi see United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) Federal Law No. 18/1981, arts.
3, 9 & 10, Law No. 11/1973; Decision No. 25/1979. See also Bahrain, Commercial Agencies
Law, Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1975, as amended by Amiri Decree No. 13/1980, and as
supplemented by Ministerial Orders Nos. 9/1981 and 17/1986; Egyptian Law No. 120/1981
of Aug. 5, 1982 (in force since May 5, 1982); Indonesian Ministerial Decree No. 314/Kp./
XII/70 and Decree No. 78/Kp./I1/78; Iraqi Law No. I I of Jan. 31, 1983; Jordanian Law No.
20/1974, art. 4, as amended by Law No. 23/1979 effective May 16, 1979; Kuwaiti Law No.
2 of 1961, Laws No. 36, 37, & 43 of 1964, Law No. 32 of 1969 (Kuwait does permit a
foreigner to hold up to 49% of the equity of its Kuwaiti representative), and Law No. 68/
1980. See Belder & Khan, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Pakistan, 20 INT'L LAW.
535, 556-62 (1986); Qatar Law No. 3/1985; Saudi Arabian Royal Decree M/1l of 1962, as
amended by Royal Decree M/8 of 1973; Syrian Decree No. 151/1952, art. 21, Clarification
of Decree No. 51 Concerning Middlemen and Brokers, Office of Prime Minister Notification
No. 14/B 271/15, issued Feb. 7, 1980; U.A.E. Federal Law No. 18/1981, arts. 3, 9, & 10,
and Ministerial Decree No. 22/1981; Yemen Arab Republic Laws No. 17/1972 & No. 6/1976.
See generally Taylor & Weissman, supra note 3.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1986).
43. Saudi Arabian Royal Decree M/2 of Jan. 20, 1978. See also U.A.E., supra note 41;
Oman, on the other hand requires a local sponsor, who must be engaged before the exporter
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tries mentioned above, the use of a local representative is virtually man-
datory as a practical matter.
After checking whether the proposed representative needs to be a local
national, and then checking that the selected representative meets this
requirement, it is important to determine whether the foreign represen-
tative needs to register with or notify the government of the representa-
tion. In the Middle East such cumulative registration requirements are
quite common. 44 Similar requirements exist in some South American
countries. 45 Often, both the representative and the representation agree-
ment must be separately registered and approved. 46 The approval often
extends to a substantive examination of the representative's remunera-
tion.47 The United States exporter next needs to be concerned whether
government contracts will be entered into. If so, special requirements
may have to be observed under foreign law. Israel, for example, has long
required that special permission be obtained before a commission be granted
for the sale of military wares to the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry
then developed the practice of publicly regulating the allowable commis-
sion rate. 48 Saudi Arabia prohibits the use of agents on certain armaments
contracts and on government-to-government contracts.4 9 Also, the United
States exporter needs to be concerned about the impact of United States
even arrives in Oman. Royal Decree No. 3/1974, as amended by Royal Decrees No. 2/1977
and 16/1978 and The Law of Commercial Agencies, Royal Decree No. 26/1977.
44. See, e.g., Bahrain, supra note 41; Egyptian Law, supra note 41; Promulgating Law
for Organizing Operations of Commercial Agency and Certain Mediation Activities with
the Executive, Reg. & Order No. 342/1982 (Egypt); Jordanian Law, supra note 41; Kuwaiti
Law No. 36/1964, art. 3; Syrian Law No. 151/1952, art. 19; Iraqi Law, supra note 41; Saudi
Arabian Law, supra notes 41 & 43; U.A.E., supra note 41. See also Argentinian Law No.
20.575 of Jan. 2, 1974 (derogated by Law No. 21.382/1976); South Korean Antimonopoly
and Fair Trade Law, art. 24 (1981); South Korean Implementing Decree art. 28 & Economic
Planning Board Notice No. 49; French Decree No. 58-1345 of Dec. 23, 1958, art. 4 (requiring
commercial agents to register with the Commercial Court); Netherlands' Handelsregisterwet
(Trade Register Act), art. I (1)(b) (requiring agents having authority to bind the principal
to register); Swiss OR, Co, Co, arts. 418a & 418c.
45. See, e.g., Bolivian Commercial Code, Law of Mar. 29, 1977, art. 1250. See generally
id. arts. 1248-1259; Colombian Commercial Code, Decree No. 410, art. 1320 (Mar. 27, 1971).
46. See, e.g., Argentinian Law, supra, note 44; Abu Dhabi Circular No. 3/78 of Feb. 8,
1976; Bahrain, supra note 41; Saudi Arabian Royal Decree, supra note 41, arts. 10 & I 1
and Implementing Regulations (the agreement must cover the capacity and nationality of
the exporter and the representative, the territory, the scope of the representation, its term
and renewal, and termination procedures); Saudi Arabian Ministry of Commerce, Model
Agency Contract, 1981 (available from Office of the Near East, International Trade Admin-
istration, Department of Commerce); Syrian Decree, supra note 41.
47. Id.
48. See Israeli Law 5737-1976 of Dec. 20, 1976 (superseded in 1985-1986 according to
Israeli Embassy sources).
49. See, e.g., Homsy, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, 16 INT'L LAW.
51, 59 (1982).
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legislation such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 the Export Admin-
istration Act, 51 and Treasury Department Anti-Boycott Regulations. 52
Finally, if EximBank financing is obtained, proper EximBank disclosures
will need to be made. 53
11. THE INCORPORATION OF THE FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVE
Clearly, the appointment of a foreign representative is seldom a straight-
forward business decision. The United States exporter should be con-
cerned whether its foreign business partner is incorporated. If it is
incorporated, then labor law protections most likely will not apply.54 Since
the United States exporter usually does not wish to establish a legal and
taxable presence in a foreign country, appropriate steps should be taken
to prevent the exporter from being subject to foreign labor laws. Con-
sequently, the appointment should not specify matters that indicate em-
ployment. 55 Regardless of whether the agent is incorporated, prudence
suggests that to prevent the implication that the agent is an employee,
the contract should give the agent wide freedom to organize and operate
the day-to-day affairs of the agency as its management pleases in return
for commission without salary or reimbursement for expenses. Two good
examples of matters that should not be specified in the contract are the
hours of the foreign representative's trading and its place of business.
The following discussion assumes that the foreign representative is in-
corporated rather than an individual.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1986).
51. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 and implementing Department of Commerce Regulations
at 15 C.F.R. §§ 369.1-.8 (1986). See also International Economic Emergency Powers Act,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1986).
52. I.R.C. § 908, 927, 952(a) 995(b)(I)(F), 999; 51 Fed. Reg. 25,286 (regulations listing
countries requiring cooperation with an international boycott); 49 Fed. Reg. 26,208; 49 Fed.
Reg. 18,061; 49 Fed. Reg. 1075; 49 Fed. Reg. 53,003; 47 Fed. Reg. 56,490. See also I.R.S.
Form 5713; Department of Commerce International Trade Administration Regulations, 48
Fed. Reg. 26,854 & 47 Fed. Reg. 14,205.
53. Export-Import Bank of the U.S. Regulations appear at 12 C.F.R. §§ 400.735-1 to -76
(1986).
54. See, e.g., Argentinian Law No. 11.544/1929, as amended by Decree-Law No. 10.375/
1956 and Law No. 16.15; Argentinian Law No. 14.546/1958 (extending labor law benefits to
business agents); French CODE Du TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.]; Judgment of Jan. 13, 1972, Cass.
civ. soc., Fr., Bull. Civ. VI; Judgment of June 23, 1966, Cass. ch. reun. Fr., 1966 Bull. Civ.
I11, at 2; Judgment of Mar. I, 1973, Cass. civ. soc., Fr., 1973, Juris-Classeur Periodique
[J.C.P.], Etudes et Commentaries, No. 11754, at 281.
55. See, e.g., Argentinian Laws, supra note 54; French C. TRAV. art. 291 (agency con-
tracts for France should explicitly exclude the relationships of employment and Voyageur
Representant et Placier); Mexican Federal Labor Law, 1970 Dianio Oficial [D.O.] art. 285;
but see id. art. 15, making the exporter jointly and severally liable to the representative's
employees for labor law obligations.
VOL. 21, NO. 4
NEGOTIATING & DRAFTING INT'L AGREEMENTS 959
12. TERM OF THE APPOINTMENT
In every foreign distributorship the term of appointment will constitute
an important point of negotiation. Exporters will inevitably prefer to limit
a term of appointment, whereas the foreign representative will seek se-
curity of tenure. In counseling the American exporter, it is important to
point out that the longer the term agreed to, either as a single term or by
virtue of an evergreen clause, the more difficult and costly it will be to
terminate the arrangement even once that term comes to an end. Opti-
mally, the term should be a fixed and definite term of no longer than two
years. Where, however, the foreign representative needs to invest capital
in a product that it will be marketing, a fixed two-year term will not
encourage the necessary investment. A foreign representative with no
security of tenure is unlikely to have the necessary motivation to promote
sales vigorously. The exporter's market penetration may then be insuf-
ficient to satisfy the exporter. Consequently, a more reasonable compro-
mise is to establish a provisional or trial period for a nominal two-year
period.
This trial contract should express an intention that its terms may form
the basis for further negotiation at the end of the trial period, and that if
both parties are pleased with the trial period they shall indicate their
satisfaction to the other party, commence negotiations well in advance of
the two-year trial term, and undertake to negotiate in good faith towards
a more permanent arrangement. The trial contract should not state that
its terms will form the basis of a further agreement. Evergreen problems
would result. The recommended procedure presents a number of advan-
tages. First, the exporter takes a minimal business risk, but is nevertheless
able to give the representative reasonable assurance of an ongoing rela-
tionship. The exporter as well as the representative should feel comfort-
able with inserting performance criteria against which the trial period
might be measured. Secondly, if the trial is unsuccessful from the ex-
porter's perspective, the exporter may, and indeed should, advise the
foreign representative of its dissatisfaction before the end of the trial
period. Because it is a trial period, any damages or indemnity due to the
foreign representative for the termination will be minimized. Of great
importance in establishing a trial contract is the requirement that both
renewal and termination (as alternatives) require an affirmative act of
notifying the other party so that there can be no doubt as to whether the
trial was or was not successful.
Furthermore, foreign representation arrangements can provide for dif-
ferent stages, not unlike stages often inserted in joint venture agreements,
with a right of termination (subject to proper notice) at the end of each
stage. In this way the expectations of the contracting parties are clearly
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delineated, the development of the foreign representative is clearly charted,
and the representative's performance can be scaled in a reasonable fashion
to the responsiveness of the marketplace. The representation agreement
should also permit the alteration of specific criteria of the various stages
should uncontrollable, outside circumstances intervene to prevent the
representative from meeting the parties' initial expectations for any par-
ticular market. Certainly, if the market response to the products in ques-
tion does not correspond to the parties' expectations due to no discernible
fault of the representative, good faith would dictate appropriate adjust-
ments in measuring the representative's performance in each stage of
development. The contract should explicitly allow for such adjustments,
and establish procedures for any necessary negotiations. If, on the other
hand, the criteria are to be absolute, clear, and concise, language should
be included in the contract to make this perfectly unambiguous.
Use of evergreen or automatic renewal clauses without specifying a
condition subsequent (such as notice to renew, achievement of perfor-
mance criteria, etc.) that must occur before renewal should be avoided
because a great many foreign jurisdictions will interpret automatic renewal
as an intention to create a contract of indefinite duration. 56 Such contracts
lead to high termination indemnity problems.
Even under United States law, evergreen contracts are unpredictable
and not favored by courts. Courts will most likely hold contracts that fail
to provide for a definitive term and are silent as to termination to be
terminable at will, 57 subject, of course, to good faith and what, under the
particular prevailing circumstances, might be deemed to be reasonable
notice of termination. 58 Other courts have adopted a variation of the
termination-at-will doctrine by holding that distributorship agreements of
indefinite duration are cancellable after a reasonable period of time. 59 Not
surprisingly, the "reasonableness" of the duration has a direct relationship
to the time period required for the distributor to recoup any capital in-
vestment and, possibly, to make a reasonable profit on such investment.
The moral of the story, of course, is that the duration of the proposed
commercial relationship is of the utmost importance, and must be clearly
provided for in the contract.
56. As outlined in text infra section 20.
57. Annotation, Termination by Principal of Distributorship Contract Containing No Ex-
press Provision for Termination, 19 A.L.R.3d 196 (1981).
58. Zidell Explorations Inc. v. Conval Int'l, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distrib. v. Drewrys Ltd., 256 Iowa 899, 129 N.W.2d 731
(1964).
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13. SCOPE OF THE APPOINTMENT 6 0
Very often representatives will not be granted rights over the whole of
the exporter's range of products, or the contract is made with only one
division of an exporter. Particularly in the case of representatives who
are not familiar with a large exporter's corporate organization, it is helpful
to spell out these limitations. The agreement should clearly specify the
product(s) involved and whether the product list may be subject to alter-
ation upon the happening of certain events, such as, for example, the
representative's failure or success to meet performance criteria. In the
event the exporter desires to make direct shipments into the territory
generally, or only to specific accounts, such reservations must be clearly
set forth. Where an exclusive agency is granted, commissions generally
will be payable to the agent in certain jurisdictions (such as West Germany)
on direct sales into the territory by the exporter.6'
As a matter of protecting its good name, an exporter may insist on a
right to reserve from a representative products that, it later turns out, the
representative is unable to service. The more powerful a bargaining po-
sition the exporter has, the more likely it is that the exporter will be able
to insist that it may reserve a product from the representative in the future
as a matter of unfettered discretion, subject to an obligation to exercise
good faith.
A representation agreement should also be explicit as to whose re-
sponsibility it is to arrange all the necessary governmental approvals for
the delivery of the product. Quite often the foreign representative is ob-
ligated to obtain all requisite foreign approvals or, at least, to assist and
cooperate with the exporter in obtaining the same. A clause should be
added obligating the foreign representative to keep the exporter advised
of any changes in such laws. Furthermore, United States export controls
and foreign import controls on products, services, technology, and pos-
sibly post-sale servicing equipment may restrict the transnational move-
ment of tangibles or intangibles and impact the exporter's expectations.
The agreement should permit the exporter to postpone or terminate any
shipments of products and equipment or the delivery of any technology,
if the exporter may be required to do so as a result of applicable law.
As the products need to be carefully identified, so should the agreement
concisely provide a geographical territory or sometimes even industry
restrictions, although the latter are more difficult to enforce in distribution
60. We do not here discuss terms controlling the sale of goods relevant to sales by the
exporter to the distributor or to the agent's customers. Price, credit, transfer of title, risk
of loss, warranties, and other terms are nonetheless deserving of precise and clear drafting.
61. See, e.g., Vorbrugg & Mahler, supra note 3, at 610.
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agreements. Clarity in these restrictions will permit the representative and
the exporter to devise territory or customer-specific marketing and pro-
motional strategies. Similar to identifying a product range with potential
additions and deletions, the agreement might, if desirable, provide for
potential expansion or contraction of specific territories or industries.
14. PROTECTING THE EXPORTER'S GOODWILL
The exporter will have an interest in preserving its reputation for man-
ufacturing high quality goods, for filling customers' orders quickly, and
for servicing the product in a prompt and satisfactory manner. While these
considerations should have been evaluated at the time of selecting the
right representative, the exporter should insure that the distributor main-
tains this level of integrity by including clauses requiring the distributor
to: (1) maintain an adequate inventory to fill anticipated orders promptly;
(2) establish procedures for servicing the product, including the hiring
and training of competent personnel and the purchase of necessary tools,
machinery and equipment; 62 and (3) provide the exporter access to the
distributor's premises for purposes of inspection, coupled with an obli-
gation on the distributor to promptly remedy any deficiencies.
One of the key elements that permits the exporter to avoid unpleasant
surprises is the periodic reporting obligation that is imposed on the foreign
representative. This obligation is crucial to a successful ongoing relation-
ship, and should always be combined with an obligation on the parties to
meet and consult with one another. The reporting obligation, and the
exporter's response in the event a report indicates unsatisfactory perfor-
mance, is often the key consideration in litigation with a terminated rep-
resentative. While we will discuss this issue in greater detail later on,
suffice it to say here that the exporter should communicate to the rep-
resentative, and document in such communication, any dissatisfaction
with the representative's performance. The periodic reports should relate
to such matters as the representative's financial strength, the volume of
sales in a particular market or sub-market, the representative's efforts to
promote the products and develop the market, resale prices (in case of a
distributor), activities of competitors (including competitors' pricing), in-
tellectual property infringements, post-sale servicing of products, inven-
tory levels, customer complaints, change in local laws affecting the
62. Saudi Arabia, for example, imposes upon Saudi agents and distributors an obligation
to provide adequate local maintenance, service, and spare parts. Saudi Arabian Royal Decree
M/32, 1980, art. 23. This provision is designed to protect the interests of Saudi consumers
of imports. The Saudi Ministry of Commerce has also produced a Model Representation
Contract, article 9 of which requires the exporter to provide optimal support to the Saudi
representative for local maintenance, service, and spare parts.
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products, their importation, distribution or insurance, and product liability
matters.
The manner in which the product is advertised is also an important
business concern for both the exporter and the distributor. Clauses should
specify, to the extent possible, the distributor's and exporter's respective
duties for (1) the provision of literature and other promotional material,
and the need for translation as appropriate; and (2) the cost of such
advertising. Again, these clauses must be carefully worded to avoid dis-
turbing the distributor's independence.
Preventing the foreign distributor from granting warranties in excess of
what the exporter, through his own experience, knows to be commercially
reasonable is also a key provision to maintaining a product's good rep-
utation. This holds true for agents as well as distributors. The exporter
would be well advised to insist on an indemnification clause in the contract
to protect the exporter against third party liability if the representative
exceeds the warranty terms authorized by the exporter. One provision
often forgotten in warranty clauses is the use or tolerance restriction. If
a product is utilized for purposes other than its specified use or beyond
its specified tolerances, the contract should expressly exclude and deny
any express or implied warranties.
III. Terminating Foreign Representatives
15. STRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP TO FACILITATE TERMINATION
While the distinction between agency and distributorship is generally
important in Europe, 63 it is seldom important in Latin America or the
Middle East. 64 In Western Europe, failure to delineate effectively between
agency and distributorship can have significant legal consequences. A
growing trend exists to judicially extend agency protections to distributors
and vice-versa. To some extent this trend has evolved because courts are
63. E.g., Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] arts. 84-92(c) and Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]
arts. 164-181, 611-630, 662-676 (W. Ger.); CODE CIVIL (C. Civ.) arts. 1984-2010 & Decree
No. 58-1345 of Dec. 23, 1958 (Fr.); see also Law No. 85-1708 of Dec. 30, 1985 (Fr.); CODICE
CIVILE [C.c.] arts. 1742-1753, Law No. 204/May 3, 1985 & Ministerial Decree 21-08-1985
(Italy), Presidential Decree No. 145-1961 (enforcing national contract of June 20, 1956, for
agents appointed by manufacturers), Presidential Decree No. 1842 of Dec. 26, 1960 (enforcing
national contract of Oct. 13, 1958, for agents appointed by sales organizations), and national
contracts of Dec. 19, 1979, and June 24, 1981, for agents appointed by industrial and
commercial companies; WETBOEK VAN KOOPHANDEL [WvK] art. 75a-75s (Neth.); Royal
Decree 1438 of Aug. 1, 1985 (Spain); Decree No. 178/86 of July 3, 1986 (Port.). The European
Economic Council has proposed draft harmonization legislation for the Community. The
British, in particular, have strongly criticized both the draft and attempted redrafts.
64. E.g., Brazilian Federal Law No. 4886 of Dec. 10, 1965, art. 27(5); Saudi Arabian
Royal Decree M/32/1980, art. 1; Belder & Khan, supra note 41, at 561-62; Swacker, supra
note 3, at 95.
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required to reevaluate whether an agent or a distributor is one in fact, or
has only been called thus to circumvent local laws. Since foreign repre-
sentation agreements form the basis for an ongoing business relationship,
they should be able to accommodate such trends in the law. Consequently,
the prudent lawyer will not rely overly on flexible statutory distinctions
between agents and distributors. Exporters should be advised that al-
though contractual protections for distributors can be weaker than those
given to agents, the gap is narrowing.
16. AGENCY VERSUS DISTRIBUTORSHIP: STILL
A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE
Having regard to the functional distinctions between agents and dis-
tributors, the exporter may exercise its business judgment to prefer an
agency arrangement over a distributorship. The exporter may want to
control the selling process either permanently or for an initial period. The
contract may indicate that the agency relationship will only apply for a
trial period during which the principal will gradually hand over control in
respect of operational matters. If the trial is satisfactory, a distributorship
arrangement may be entered into. In using an agency as a trial mechanism,
the agency term must be kept short so as to avoid the implication of
permanent establishment in the foreign country.
If an agent is appointed, the agent should be incorporated to avoid the
application of local labor laws. 65 If an agent were classified as an employed
salesperson, not only might there be labor law consequences, but the
United States exporter may be deemed to have established itself in the
foreign country and be subject to taxation there. This problem is not
eliminated by the appointment of an incorporated agent, but the agency
contract should indicate an intention not to establish permanently in the
foreign country.
Also, the agent should be required to take full responsibility for the
payment of employees and for meeting any claims of those employees.
The agent should be required to indemnify the United States exporter for
any liability the United States exporter might incur under local laws for
employee claims. As shall be discussed below, many countries permit a
terminated agent or, in Belgium, a terminated distributor, to pass through
to the exporter, the agent's or the distributor's costs of terminating its
own employees. This pass-through should be expressed excluded, and an
indemnity inserted as a backup to the exclusion of the pass-through. 66
65. See text supra section 11.
66. Belgium, for example, gives especially high termination indemnities to terminated
salespersons. The indemnity can amount to two or three years' income. Belgian Law of
July 30, 1963, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1969; Jones, supra note 3, at 118.
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Notwithstanding that an agent is not ultimately responsible for supplying
customers, it often makes good sense for the agent to be given some
responsibility, much as a distributor would, for getting the goods from
the ship or aircraft to the customer. The agent should be required to assist
with the clearance of goods through customs and assure successful in-
ternal carriage of the goods.
17. AN OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION
We next proceed to a review of the major issues that arise in connection
with foreign protective laws, including a discussion of various national
provisions. 67 We also look at some common approaches to appointment
67. Many countries provide representative protection legislation. The following laws in-
clude those that place substantial burdens on the exporter wishing to terminate its foreign
representative. Austrian Mercantile Agents Law of 1921, as amended June 15, 1978 (protects
agents only) and see Foreign Trade Act amendment of 1984; Bahrain, supra note 41; Belgian
Law, supra note 24 (protects distributors only); Brazilian Fed. Law, supra note 64, arts.
27-39 (protects agents only); Colombian COMMERCIAL CODE, arts. 1317-1331; Costa Rican
Law, supra note 25; Dom. Rep. Law No. 173 of Apr. 6, 1966, amended by Law No. 263 of
Dec. 31, 1971, Law No. 622 of Dec. 28, 1973; Dom. Rep. Law No. 664 of 1977; Ecuadoran
Supreme Decree 1038-A, Official Register No. 245, Dec. 31, 1976; El Salvador COMMERCIAL
CODE, arts. 392-399b, as amended by Decree No. 247 of Jan. 3, 1973; Finnish Law No. 389
of May 30, 1975 (protects agents only); French C. Civ., supra note 63 (protects agents
only); Guatemalan Decree No. 78-71, Official Gazette of Oct. I, 1971, supplemented by
nonabrogated provisions of Decree No. 270 of May, 1970, and the Civil and Commercial
Codes; Honduran Decree No. 50 of Oct. 8, 1970, amended by Decree No. 549, Nov. 24,
1977, and Decree No. 804, Sept. 10, 1979; Italian C.c., supra note 63 (protects agents only);
Indonesian Decree No. 295/M/SK/7/1982 & Decree No. 446/M/SK/7/1982 (regarding sole
agency of electronic equipment and household electrical appliances) and Decree No. 397/
M/SK/7/1982 (regarding subagency of automotive products and heavy equipment), cf. Reg.
No. 77/Kp/III/78 (minimum duration is three years), and Decree No. 502/UPTS/1985 (re-
stricts representation in the construction industry); Jordanian Law, supra note 41; Kuwaiti
Commercial Law, effective Feb. 25, 1981, arts. 281-282; Moroccan Dahir of May 21, 1943;
Netherlands WvK, supra note 63 (protects agents only); Nicaraguan Decree No. 13 of Jan.
5, 1980 (reenacting and modifying Decree No. 287 of Feb. 2, 1972) (further modified by
Sandinist authorities); Norwegian Law of June 30, 1916, amended by Law of June 1, 1973;
Omani Royal Decree, supra note 43, and Royal Decree No. 26/77 arts. 7 & 8, Omani Official
Gazette of Jan. 6, 1977; Panamanian Executive Decree No. 344 of Oct. 31, 1969, and Decrees
No. 9 of Feb. 7, 1970, and No. 48 of Apr. 6, 1971; Philippines, e.g., Presidential Decree No.
1789 (Omnibus Investments Code applies only if the foreign exporter is "doing business"
in the Philippines), and Corporation Law (Act. No. 1456 as amended), Foreign Business
Regulations Act (R.A. 5455), Investment Incentives Act (R.A. 5186, as amended) and the
National Internal Revenue Code; Portuguese Decree, supra note 63; Puerto Rican Civ. &
COMM. CODE, supra note 25; Saudi Arabian Royal Decree M/Il of 1962, as amended by
Royal Decrees M/5 of 1969, M/8 of 1973, and M/32 of 1980; Ministerial Decision No. 1897,
Official Gazette No. 2865 (Apr. 17, 1981) (termination compensation is actually indicated
only by administrative practice); Spanish Royal Decree, supra note 63 (applies only to
individuals, not to legal entities acting as agent); Swedish Act of April 18, 1914, amended
by Law 219 of May 1974 (protects agents only); Swiss Law of Agency Agreements of Feb.
4, 1949 (protects agents only); U.A.E. Federal Act. No. 18 of Aug. It, 1981 (effective Feb.
24, 1982), art. 9, and Ministerial Decree No. 22 of 1981; Venezuelan Labor Law of Nov. 3,
1947 (entitles "unfairly" discharged agents to employee benefits); W. Ger. HGB & BGB,
supra note 63 (protects agents only).
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and termination in international representation agreements drafted by
American lawyers. We state at the outset of this portion of the discussion
that attempts to draft around the various protective laws have generally
failed. Even when clauses purporting to limit or avoid statutory protec-
tions do not form the subject of litigation, they often create an acrimonious
business climate. Both the exporter's and the foreign representative's
profits suffer.
Two authors have recently identified thirty-two countries that restrict
the termination of a foreign representative. 6 8 Such legislation is often a
reaction to essentially unfair and unconscionable contract terms. For many
years American exporters were perceived as overly tough negotiators
insisting on harsh terms for the distribution of their products. Often a
foreign representative would develop clientele and goodwill, and the ex-
porter, recognizing the now established and profitable salability of its
product in the representative's country, terminated the representative in
order to garner those profits itself.69
Two key elements typify the legislation enacted in many countries as
a response to these concerns: minimum notice requirements and com-
pensation requirements. Usually, the representative is entitled to generous
notice of termination and both compensatory and precatory damages. 70
Compensatory damages usually compensate for a lack of reasonable
notice of termination. These damages will be awarded in the absence of
just cause for the termination, and include a measure of the net profits
that the distributor would have obtained during the notice period foregone
(inventory the distributor could have sold), the fixed costs to the distrib-
utor of the distributorship, and an estimate of goodwill (usually propor-
tionate to the trend in the distributor's gross sales).
In the jurisdictions most protective of the representative, assessment
of precatory damages can be expected in most cases of termination. The
indemnity payable for precatory damages is designed to compensate for
loss of the representative's subjective expectations of an ongoing rela-
tionship. Only if these expectations are unreasonable will a court in such
protective jurisdictions not award this indemnity. Precatory damages usu-
68. Saltoun & Spudis, supra note 2, at 885, 914-16. In July 1986 Portugal also enacted
protective legislation. See supra note 63. We also add Morocco to the list and have deleted
Lebanon because of the collapse of the rule of law in that country.
69. Saltoun & Spudis, supra note 2.
70. The terminology "compensatory" and "precatory" is our own. While the notion of
compensation is relatively familiar, the indemnity to which a terminated representative is
often entitled includes damages for lost expectations, which vary from the concrete to the
speculative. We describe them as precatory because they compensate for dashed hopes.
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ally include a measure of any increase in clientele obtained by the dis-
tributor that accrues to the benefit of the exporter after termination, and
those expenses incurred by the distributor in operating the distributorship
that benefit the exporter after termination (for example, marketing the
exporter's trademark and amounts owed by the distributor to personnel
dismissed as a result of the termination), and will cover the unexpired
portion of the contract term plus any likely renewals. 7
1
Additionally, a terminated distributor may block direct sales by the
exporter and inhibit registration of a replacement representative until the
exporter has paid what the terminated representative considers to be
adequate compensation. In Arab countries termination and replacement
may be impossible once word of the termination spreads. The terminated
representative will often avenge his wounded feelings by fouling the rep-
utation of the exporter and its products.
Lest protective legislation deter the United States exporter, economic
common sense has resulted in many exporters discounting the commis-
sions payable to an agent or the price charged to a distributor by the
present value of estimated termination settlements. In the final analysis,
protective foreign legislation is no more and no less than yet another cost
of doing business overseas.
The following provisions will enhance an exporter's ability to achieve
freedom to terminate: (1) the notice period should be generous, and the
method of giving notice should be set forth clearly and followed in its
application; (2) a provision identifying an initial limited term as a trial
period during or at the end of which either party may refuse (by proper
notice) to renew the contract if agreed expectations are not achieved or
if either party should determine the results to be unsatisfactory; (3) rea-
sonable terms limiting compensation upon termination, or, for the more
optimistic draftsman, waiving them; (4) the "just cause" for termination
clause should give an illustrative, nonexhaustive list of events that will
justify termination; and (5) sensible choice of law, choice of forum, and
submission to personal jurisdiction clauses. The exporter may also want
to include a provision whereby it will have the option to terminate the
arrangements during a reasonable time if certain individuals in the rep-
resentative's organization change or if there is a substantial change in
ownership, explicitly defining these events to be agreed "just causes" for
termination.
71. Sunt, supra note 3, at 22; Swacker, supra note 3, at 99-100. See generally Puelinckx
& Tielemans, supra note 2.
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18. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Some countries' laws grant the representative either a right to generous
notice of termination or a fulsome indemnity upon termination. 72 Many
grant both. 73 Rights to notice as well as rights to indemnity usually depend
upon whether the termination is for the convenience of the exporter or
due to some breach of the representative agreement by the agent or dis-
tributor. The consequences of the two types of termination can be quite
different, and so in the following discussion we distinguish between ter-
mination for convenience and termination for just cause. Where notice
and compensation are alternatives, notice is required mostly for termi-
nations of convenience rather than terminations for just cause.
Given the strict protections accorded by protective statutes, termination
clauses should track the statutory termination rules. Counsel should note
that while proper notice avoids the need to pay compensation for termi-
nation by way of indemnity, precatory as opposed to compensatory dam-
ages cannot always be avoided, though a reasonable liquidated damages
or buy-out provision will usually be enforced. 74 For example, a Belgian
distributorship agreement should require that notice be given not less than
three months nor more than six months prior to the end of the contract
term, and that a party wishing to terminate must notify the other by
registered letter, or else the contract is deemed to be renewed. 75 The
parties can deviate from this standard by mutual accord at the time notice
of termination is given, but not in the contract itself or by amendment to
the contract. 76 The statutory objective is to permit the terminated party
to obtain a new business of reasonable equivalent economic value. More-
over, during the notice period, neither the exporter nor a replacement
distributor may compete with the terminated distributor.
The Belgian Cour de Cassation has on at least one occasion upheld a
contractual waiver of the rights to indemnity and to notice. 77 The Belgian
72. See, e.g., Swedish Act, supra note 67; cf. The Indian Contract Act, 1872, §§ 203-206
(notice is mandatory in all terminations).
73. See, e.g., Port. Decree, supra note 63, art. 30 (one month notice required for ter-
minations for cause); Cowles, Indemnities for Terminating Foreign Representatives, 53 B.U.L.
REV. 278, 287 (1973); Jones, supra note 3, at 113-14, 117, 119, 123, 124; Juncadella, supra
note 3, at 36-37, 40, 41, 43, 47, 49.
74. Sunt, supra note 3, at 22. Termination for just cause is conditioned on a "serious
failure" to comply with the distributorship agreement, e.g., failure to sell a single item, zero
promotional activity, or zero payments for goods delivered. Id.
75. Law of July 27 on the Unilateral Termination of Exclusive Distributorship Agreement
of Infinite Duration, Moniteur, Beige, supra note 24, art. 3.
76. Id. art. 2.
77. Judgment of Apr. 19, 1973, Cour de Cassation (Belgium), 1980 J.C.B. 440-455. cited
in Simons, supra note 3, at 759.
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courts, however, have no difficulty in perceiving abuse of the waiver and
awarding damages in the form of an indemnity for such abuse. Finally, a
Belgian distributorship should state that two such renewals, between the
same parties, regardless of any modification or renegotiation of the con-
tract, will not constitute a contract of indefinite duration. Judicially im-
plied notice periods for contracts of indefinite duration can be up to three
years.
Similarly, where the governing statutes in other countries permit ter-
mination for convenience, the contractual provisions should closely track
the statute. Should such a termination clause be subjected to judicial
scrutiny, and otherwise comply with applicable law, the clause is likely
to be enforced in accordance with its terms, thus avoiding unpleasant
surprises for the United States exporter. For example, in West Germany
an agency contract may establish its own required notice periods for a
termination of the agency.78 If no notice period is expressed, the Han-
delsgesetzbuch implies one. In the first three years of an agency, six
weeks' notice given at the end of a quarter year will suffice. Thereafter,
six months notice must be given, again at the end of a quarter year.
Moreover, a contractual notice period of less than one month will receive
strict judicial scrutiny for reasonableness of such "urgent" termination. 79
19. DEFINING "JUST CAUSE"
Civil law countries have varying lists of acceptable reasons for termi-
nating a foreign representation.80 The primary substantive issue is just
how serious a breach of contract is required before an agency or distrib-
utorship may be terminated. Most jurisdictions permit the parties to agree
as to what constitutes "just cause" for termination. If the contents of the
list are reasonable, the list will likely be judicially respected. 81
In West Germany agency terminations have not been judicially ques-
tioned where (1) the agent induces another agent working for the same
78. HGB (W. Ger.) art. 89, § 1.
79. Accord WvK, supra note 63, reprinted in Doing Business In Europe, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 26,791. While Japan respects contractual notice periods exercised in good
faith, if no notice period is provided for, art. 50 of the Commercial Code sets two months
as the appropriate notice period. Thirty days is generally considered reasonable in a domestic
context. See, e.g., Blalock Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774 (N.D.
Ga. 1983).
80. See, e.g., Austrian Mercantile Agents Law, supra note 67, art. 1, as amended, July
30, 1960; Brazilian Federal Law, supra note 64, arts. 34-35; Colombian Law, supra note 45,
art. 1325; Dom. Rep. Law, supra note 67; Ecuadoran Supreme Decree, supra note 67.
81. Cf. Schultz v. Oman Corp., 737 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying the Minnesota
equitable recoupment doctrine to an agreement permitting termination for convenience upon
60 days notice).
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principal to join a competitor of the principal; 82 (2) the agent is constantly
and grossly negligent in the commercialization of the principal's product;8 3
(3) the agent enters into unauthorized sales of competing brands;8 4 or (4)
the agent refuses to comply with the principal's instructions, for example,
with respect to advertising. 85 Poor sales performance, however, will gen-
erally not be adequate grounds for dismissal without notice unless such
performance falls within the contractually defined parameters of "just
cause." 86 Of course, the advantage of agency over distributor relation-
ships is the control that the exporter can exercise over the agent's activ-
ities. The exporter cannot exercise equivalent control over the independent
distributor. The exporter can control every facet of an agent's operations,
including pricing, the method of distribution, and conditions of sales. To
some exporters this is important enough to warrant subjecting themselves
to the agency protective laws.
An illustrative list of justifiable termination events should be contrac-
tually set forth. Furthermore, the contract should state that the list is not
exhaustive, and should negate any application of the maxim ejusdem
generis. Notwithstanding these qualifications, the list should be as ex-
haustive as possible.
One alternative that is growing in popularity is to require the victim of
a breach to notify the party in breach, and to require that the two parties
consult with each other in good faith on the most effective means to cure
the breach and to achieve any necessary restitution of its consequences.
A time limit should be set within which these consultations would occur,
coupled with a requirement that neither litigation nor arbitration may be
pursued until attempts at consultative dispute resolution have been ex-
hausted. Often much wasted time, trouble, and expense can be avoided
if the contract by its terms encourages the parties to negotiate creative
solutions rather than to adopt adversarial postures. 87
Possibly the most popular "just cause" for termination in representative
arrangements is failure to meet a stepped-up quota. This quota usually
increases over the life of the representation. The preamble to the quota
provision might recite that the quota is being stepped-up in proportion to
anticipated growth in goodwill for the exporter's product and trademark.
82. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1977, 1977 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 1170; see also 1979 DER
BETRIEBS-BERATER 242, and 1983 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 1629.
83. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1963, 1963 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 447.
84. Judgment of Feb. 23, 1972, 1972 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 467.
85. Judgment of June 9, 1960, 1960 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 956.
86. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1970, 1971 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 572; accord, Judgment of
Feb. 28, 1963, 1963 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 447; Puelinckx & Tielemans, supra note 2, at
460.
87. See text infra section 24. This alternative includes the possibility of an"abridged mini-
trial."
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Either party should be permitted to approach the other for reasonable
adjustments to the quota should special circumstances arise. The foreign
representative should acknowledge that low sales hurt the exporter's
goodwill in the territory, and that if the representative is terminated be-
cause of failure to meet the quota, the representative will not be entitled
to compensation, since the damage to the exporter's goodwill is likely to
be at least as great as the losses the representative might incur as result
of the termination.
20. TERMINATING CONTRACTS OF INDEFINITE DURATION
A contract that has been renewed a number of times or contains an
automatic renewal or evergreen clause is often more difficult to terminate.
In Belgium, for example, two renewals of a distributorship agreement will
constitute a contract for an indefinite duration even if its terms have been
modified substantially.88 Ecuador goes further: only the representative
has the right to terminate, and may insist on continuous renewals of a
fixed term. 89 In Portugal it seems that only contracts for indefinite duration
may be terminated for convenience. 90 The French courts are divided on
whether automatic renewals transform a contract into one of indefinite
duration. 91 Sweden, however, permits termination of a contract of indef-
inite duration without notice if the termination is for just cause. 92 In West
Germany the agency contract is deemed prolonged for an indefinite du-
ration if, upon expiration of the initial term, the agent, with the knowledge
of the principal, continues with the performance of its obligations under
the agreement.93
To protect the exporter from termination damages, renewal terms should
specify particular acts that must be done to renew the agreement, as well
as a limited renewal term. If these are not included, courts may construe
the agreement as one of unlimited duration, and hold the exporter liable
for termination damages.
21. MEASURES OF INDEMNITY FOR TERMINATION
Protective legislation will provide a terminated representative with a
right to an indemnity as compensation for the termination. We have se-
lected three European countries (West Germany, France, and Belgium),
88. Simons, supra note 3, at 756. This rule also operates in Brazil.
89. Ecuadoran Supreme Decree, supra note 67.
90. Portuguese Decree, supra note 63, art. 28.
91. Sales, supra note 3, at 747.
92. Saltoun & Spudis, supra note 2, at 888 n.14.
93. BGB § 625, supra note 63.
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and two South American countries (Brazil and Panama) as examples in
discussing the measures of compensation for terminated representatives.
A West German agent is entitled to compensation for loss of goodwill
if: (1) the principal derived considerable benefits from the contracts that
the agent had established with new clients; (2) the agent has lost or will
lose commission due to the termination of the agency; and (3) the payment
of compensation is just and fair. Maximum compensation generally equals
one year's gross commissions based on an average over the last five years
or period of the agency, whichever is shorter. No compensation need be
paid if the dismissal is reasonable and contractually permissible or if age
or illness is the reason for dismissal. 94
These protections for German agents are one variation on a theme that
runs throughout Western Europe, Belgium excepted-the protections do
not purport to cover distributors, although the Bundesgerichtshof in West
Germany will grant a distributor compensation, including for lost goodwill,
if the distributorship goes beyond a straightforward buyer-seller relation-
ship and evidences some of the hallmarks of an agency.95
In France the usual measure of damages is the average of the last two
years' commissions. A terminated agent's compensation will vary in ac-
cordance with the goodwill the agent has created for the product, the
amount of past commissions earned, the agent's investment in the agency,
the agent's specialized qualifications, the percentage of the agent's overall
business devoted to the product, the consequential cost of termination to
the agent such as staff layoffs, and any abuse of right that caused unnec-
essary hardship to the agent.96 Some confusion exists as to whether a
French agent can waive its right to an indemnity by contract. 97 Just cause
is, however, a fault-based measure, and if the agent is truly at fault, the
indemnity may not be available.
The measure of fault is significantly skewed in favor of the agent. Re-
duced sales must be "ridiculously low" to constitute just cause. 98 Also,
failure to meet reasonable sales goals will not constitute just cause where
the French agent makes reasonable efforts to sell, but the product still
loses its customer appeal. 99
94. Puelinckx & Tielemans, supra note 2, at 461.
95. Judgment of Feb. 11, 1977, 1977 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 896.
96. Sales, supra note 3, at 744.
97. See, e.g., Judgment of June 28, 1958, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1958, 2 GAZETTE DU PALAIS,
JURISPRUDENCE 253, aff'd by Cour de Cassation Judgment of July 5, 1962, Cass. civ. com.,
1962, 2 GAZETTE DU PALAIS, JURISPRUDENCE 161 (upholding freedom to waive) (followed
through 1979). But see Judgment of Dec. 13, 1973, Cour d'appel, d'Amieno, 1975 D.S. Jur.
45 (holding that "a mandate of common interest" prevented unilateral termination).
98. Sales, supra note 3, at 743.
99. Encyclopedie Dalloz, Commercial V ° , Agent Commercial NR 134; Cas. Com. Feb.
9, 1982 (Unrep; see Lamy Commercial 1983 NR 2147), cited by Sales, supra note 3, at 744.
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The statutory protections provided to distributors in Belgium depend
on an agreement being exclusive (or even quasi-exclusive, i.e., the dis-
tributor sells in the territory practically all of the products to which the
distributorship applies) or having an indefinite duration. 100 Belgian courts
will strain constructions to find a contract exclusive or quasi-exclusive or
of indefinite duration. The Belgian distributor is entitled to an indemnity
if he is terminated without just cause or without proper notice.101 Both
compensatory and precatory damages are awarded.1 02 This rule is often
applied by analogy to agents as well as distributors. 103 For an agent to
claim the indemnity, the agent must have been terminated in an abusive
and untimely manner.
In South America both terminated agents and terminated distributors
receive an indemnity when they are terminated for convenience. Agents,
however, may expect less compensation than distributors because agents
do not put up the same risk capital.l°4 When a distributor is terminated
for convenience, he loses that risk capital without good cause. In most
other respects the indemnity payable is similar to those just outlined above
for European countries.
In Brazil, if a contract is silent as to its termination, reasonable notice
will be required, and for a termination for convenience upon less than
one month's notice, the usual amount of compensation is one-third of the
last three months' earnings.' 0 5 The minimum statutorily permitted com-
pensation is one-twentieth of the total "commissions" earned during the
period of the representation; but if the contract does not contain an in-
demnity provision, or if the provision is for less than the one-twentieth
fraction, a minimum indemnity is one-fifteenth of total commissions earned.
The Panamanian law covers all representatives, agencies, and distrib-
utorships, but provides an interesting stepped-up indemnity plan. If the
terminated representation lasted less than five years, the indemnity will
be the average gross profits of the representative over those five years.
If it lasted five to ten years, then twice the average gross profits over the
100. Puelinckx & Swennen, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE
BUSINESS LAW 3-4 (1979).
101. See, e.g., Judgment of Oct. 6, 1983, Cour d'appel, Brussels, JOURNAL DE TRIBU-
NEAUX, Feb. 25, 1984, at 134.
102. Belgian Law of July 27, 1961, on the Unilateral Termination of Exclusive Distrib-
utorship Agreements of Infinite Duration, supra note 24, art. 3.
103. See, e.g., Judgment of May 10, 1982, Tribunal de Commerce, Brussels, 1983 REVUE
DE DROIT COMMERCIAL BELGE 241, 244 (fixing the indemnity by reference to the notice
period that should have been given); Judgment of Sept. 3, 1981, Tribunal de Commerce,
Brussels, 1982 J.C.B. 630 (six weeks' notice of termination for a five-year agreement held
insufficient; three months ruled to be an appropriate notice period).
104. See generally Swacker, supra note 3; (f. S.A. Putzey & Melot v. Intermed Export-
Import, 1982 J.T. 823 (Comm. Liege, Apr. 23, 1980) (noting a similar position in Belgium).
105. Swacker, supra note 3.
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last five years is payable. If it lasted ten to fifteen years the indemnity is
three times this measure; if it lasts fifteen to twenty years it is four times
the measure; and finally, if it lasts more than twenty years it is five times
this measure. In addition, the exporter must repurchase the representa-
tive's inventory at warehouse cost and pay for the holding and storage
costs incurred after termination. Just cause is defined so as to include
breach of those contract terms that induced the granting of the distribu-
torship; fault or breach of trust (or fiduciary duty); incompetence or neg-
ligence; systematic reduction in sales or distribution; breach of
confidentiality; and other prejudicial acts that prevent the normal contin-
uance of the distributorship. 106 The catch is that just cause must be es-
tablished before the Ministry of Commerce and Industry prior to the
termination being implemented. If just cause is not established, impor-
tation will be stopped until a proper indemnity is paid. If the parties settle
a matter between themselves, the settlement must have ministerial ap-
proval before importation may resume or continue.
Some waiver of compensation clauses have been struck because the
waiver of compensation has not been set out sufficiently in the contract
itself. This oversight can be a costly error because some countries do not
permit a terminated representative to be replaced, nor may the United
States exporter sell directly in the country until the terminated represen-
tative is properly compensated.' 0 7
22. OTHER TERMINATION CONSEQUENCES
Of vital importance to United States exporters is that, upon termination
of the foreign representative, the representative must return all customer
lists and documents containing trade secrets, as well as merchandise held.
The goodwill that these documents can represent belongs to the exporter.
If an agency relationship is selected, the components of the agent's
remuneration should be separately set forth in the contract. Termination
indemnities are often based on gross commissions. Even if the agent must
cover its own expenses out of commissions received, the contract should
split the commission into profit and expense portions. The contract should
expressly limit the termination indemnity to the expense portion alone.
Distributorship agreements should include clauses dealing with (1) un-
filled orders upon termination; (2) settling accounts between distributors
and exporters upon termination; and (3) instructions regarding the return
or disposition of promotional, sales, and other literature relating to the
106. See id. at 38.
107. See, e.g., Costa Rican Law, supra note 25, art. 9 (Apr. 3, 1978); Guatemalan Decree,
supra note 67, art. 8; Honduran Decree Law No. 549, art. 15 (Nov. 24, 1977).
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exporter's products in the distributor's possession at termination. These
provisions should be fair and minimize cost and embarrassment for both
the supplier and the distributor. Equitable provisions should be made for
the handling of, and compensation for, orders placed by the distributor
(1) prior to receipt of the termination notice; (2) during the notice period;
and (3) for liquidation of supplies once termination becomes effective.
Provisions should also include specifics regarding outstanding service con-
tracts the distributor may have with respect to products in the hands of
customers. A clause should also stipulate the distributor's duty to stop
using the supplier's intellectual property upon termination.
IV. Miscellaneous Issues
23. DOCUMENTATION
Civil law countries are generally more liberal than common law coun-
tries allowing reference to preliminary negotiations and other matters
extrinsic to the contract. Thus, "entire agreement" clauses, while clearly
desirable, should also delimit the scope of interpretation by incorporating
by reference (often attached as exhibits) the form of order forms, ac-
knowledgment forms, and INCOTERMS that are to be used.
24. ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
A useful initial checklist of countries where arbitration is likely to be
both available and effective is the list of parties to the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 0 8 The utility
of selecting arbitration as the preferred dispute settlement mechanism is
a matter that should be cleared with local counsel. Often national law will
permit only domestic arbitration and not arbitration overseas. 10 9 In se-
lecting the forum, parties should ensure that as between the United States
and the distributor's country, any judgments or arbitral awards will be
108. New York, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S 38 (1959).
The United States implementing legislation is embodied in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1972). The
United States acceded to the Convention with two major reservations on December 29,
1970. First, the United States would apply the Convention only to awards made in the
territory of another contracting state. Second, the Convention would only be applied to
commercial disputes as categorized under United States law. Id. § 202. A number of other
countries have made similar reservations. The Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA)
of the Southwestern Legal Foundation recently published a scoreboard of countries adhering
to various transnational arbitration treaties. The ITA's scoreboard is reproduced with the
consent of the ITA in the Appendix to this article. THE INSTITUTE FOR TRANSNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, NEWS AND NOTES (July 1987).
109. See, e.g., Honduran Decree, supra note 67, art. 21; Dom. Rep. Law, art. 7 & 8 of
Law 173/1966, supra note 67.
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recognized and enforced. 110 The arbitration clause should specify which
rules of arbitration will govern in the event of a dispute."' It should also
contain a stipulation as to choice of forum."l 2
25. PAYMENT CLAUSES
An agency agreement should specify when commissions accrue to the
account of the agent and when those commissions are payable. Accrual
and payment are two distinct points to be covered in the agreement. The
contract should clearly state that the agent has "earned" the commission,
and the commission becomes payable to the agent only when the exporter
actually has received the purchaser's payment, although this is quite a
harsh standard and should be reviewed under local or other applicable
law. While it is possible that such a clause will receive strict judicial
scrutiny, it is important to provide the agent with the necessary incentives
to collect for the sales it initiated. The exporter is often in a poor position
to initiate collection proceedings, and where legally permissible, collection
should be an explicit undertaking of the agent. Inquiries should be made
to ascertain whether regulations in the foreign representative's country
hinder or prevent currency exchange in remittance of payments to the
United States. Few free market countries prevent remittance entirely.
Many regulate remittances by establishing varying exchange rates and
levy a withholding tax on monies flowing out of the country. If the country
has entered into a double taxation treaty with the United States, that
treaty may well provide exemption from withholding. Ultimately though,
a United States tax credit can be obtained for most foreign taxation
payments.
110. Extensive literature exists on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 L. & POL.
INT'L Bus. 1191 (1977); Harnik, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
31 AM. J. COMP. L. 703 (1983).
Ill. Two of several alternatives are the International Chamber of Commerce's Arbitration
Court and Rules, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 395 (1975) and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976). See also UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985), strongly criticized in Bus. L. BRIEF
(Financial Times), May 1984, at 3-4; London Court of International Arbitration Revised
Rules, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1137 (1985). See also Euro-Arab Chamber of Commerce, Rules
of Conciliation, Arbitration and Expertise, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1119 (1985). Under art.
23-2 of the Euro-Arab rules, the parties may choose the place of arbitration, but the law
applied must include "application of the mandatory provisions of the municipal laws of the
place chosen."
112. Some jurisdictions do not admit finality of arbitrations. Common law countries that
do not have an arbitration act (and some that do) do not permit arbitration to be final.
Belgium will respect only those arbitrations that take place in Belgium and that apply Belgian
law. Law of July 27, 1961, art. 6 (although Belgium has implemented into Belgian law the
European Convention for Uniform Arbitration, Law of July 4, 1972).
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Regardless of any restrictions or regulations affecting currency ex-
change or payment, the foreign representation agreement should contain
a provision obligating the representative to arrange for requisite approvals
from, or notification to, exchange control authorities or central banks to
meet the manufacturer's objectives. Furthermore, the agreement should
explicitly select (1) a currency of account (in most South American and
many other developing countries, and certainly centrally controlled mar-
ket countries, the currency of account must often be expressed in local
currency terms); (2) a date of accounting (with rights of audit); (3) a
currency of payment (and possibly an alternative currency if subsequent
restrictions prevent the exchange into U.S. dollars); (4) the date of pay-
ment; (5) the location of payment (which should of course, if permissible
under local laws, be the exporter's United States bank); and (6) a regular
date for currency conversion that is beyond the control of either party
(to avoid any temptations). In today's climate of volatile exchange rates,
clients should be counseled that by removing discretionary elements from
the payment clause, the predictability and consistency of their business
relationship will benefit.
26. SOME TAX CONSIDERATIONS
A United States exporter negotiating for foreign representation should
structure the representation and organize conditions of sale to minimize
liability to taxation both at home and in the foreign country.
Exporters are often tempted to explicitly retain title to shipped goods
until they are paid. Under the title passage test that has prevailed under
the U.S. tax laws for many years, the geographic location where title to
the goods passed determined whether the exporter's income from the sale
constituted domestic or foreign source income for purposes of determining
the ceiling on the amount of foreign income taxes that could be credited
against the exporter's United States income taxes. Under that test, an
exporter, by transferring title outside the United States, could generate
foreign source income and hence increase the ceiling on the amount of
foreign income taxes available as a foreign tax credit. The title passage
test has generally survived in the 1986 tax legislation for sales of inventory
by United States persons.
If title is to pass abroad, the import duties, value-added-taxes and other
ad valorem imposts of the foreign country will affect the decision whether
to transfer title before or after customs clearance. The taxable value of
the goods should be minimized at the point of transit where the ad valorem
rate is highest.
Any structuring of foreign transactions should also take into account
whether the particular means proposed will result in exposure to the
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income tax jurisdiction of the foreign country. This in turn may depend
not only on the internal law of that jurisdiction, but also on whether a tax
treaty exists between the relevant jurisdictions and the limitations imposed
by any such treaty on such tax in the absence of a "permanent estab-
lishment." The scope of the definition of a "permanent establishment"
also requires examination in the event the exporter's contacts with the
foreign jurisdiction cause the exporter to have such a "permanent estab-
lishment" in order to determine whether any exemption from income
taxation under the internal laws of the foreign jurisdiction may be available.
27. TRADEMARKS AND OTHER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONCERNS
Intellectual property registration is, of course, a matter upon which
local counsel should be consulted; nevertheless, a number of general
objectives can usefully be stated. First, intellectual property protection
in the United States does not provide protection against intellectual prop-
erty raiders anywhere else. Second, registration of intellectual property
in the foreign country should be in the United States exporter's name so
that he will remain the "owner" of the intellectual property should the
need to change foreign representation ever arise (some jurisdictions may
require user registrations). Third, all intellectual property rights should
be registered before the first product is shipped. Fourth, the exporter
should consider whether it would be more appropriate to deal with in-
tellectual property protections in separate license agreements. 113 Fifth,
the agreement should obligate the foreign representative to use only the
trademark or service mark designated by the exporter in order to enhance
the recognition of the product and build goodwill.
Representatives are generally required to protect and respect their ex-
porter's intellectual property rights. Protective acts, including prosecu-
tions of illegal use of the exporter's trademarks and other intellectual
property, should be in the exporter's name (and always with his partic-
ipation) so as to leave no doubt who owns the intellectual property. In
exclusive representations, the foreign representative is usually required
to bear the cost of prosecuting infringements, though the exporter usually
bears the responsibility and costs of prosecuting infringements in nonex-
clusive territories. It is advisable to have a separate trademark license
agreement with each representative to facilitate protection of the marks
and, where necessary, to prosecute infringements.
113. The laws of many jurisdictions, such as the Andean Pact countries, require regis-
tration of intellectual property agreements, and such agreements must often be contained
in separate documents.
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Also, local laws do not always have a use requirement. Nevertheless,
it is desirable to require a relresentative to use the trademark in connec-
tion with marketing the product to the exclusion of any other marks. This
use will prevent concurrent use of any other trademark without specific
permission.
Finally, it is generally advisable that the representative undertake to
use the exporter's trademark or service mark (or any similar or potentially
confusing marks) only in connection with sales of the exporter's goods.
The agreement should prohibit the representative from incorporating the
exporter's mark on its letterhead or in the company name. Generally, the
agreement should reflect that the exporter retains total ownership of in-
tellectual properties, permits, or licenses, the representative being entitled
only to a limited use.
As a final note to this section, caution should be exercised in certain
countries such as Mexico and the Andean Common Market countries
where intellectual property rights relating to technology remain vested in
the registrant for only a limited time period (generally five years) before
,they are deemed to have been transferred to the local representative or
into the public domain.
28. SOME ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW ISSUES1 14
Antitrust or competition law concerns arise in a number of jurisdictions
in the western world. The European Economic Community, 115 , Bel-
gium, 16 Denmark, 117 Greece, 118 Ireland, 119 Netherlands, 120 Portugal, 121
Spain, 122 Sweden, 123 France, 124 West Germany, 125 the United King-
114. We do not here discuss the application of United States antitrust laws to international
transactions. The issue remains controversial and is the subject of a literature too voluminous
to treat properly in a survey article. The leading treatise in the field is J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981 with cumulative
supplement updated through August 30, 1986).
115. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 297 U.N.T.S. 2, at 47-48; 1 & 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2005 (1978).
116. Law of May 27, 1960 (not vigorously enforced).
117. Act No. 102 of Mar. 31, 1955, as amended.
118. Law No. 703/1977.
119. Restrictive Practices Act, 1972.
120. Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956, as amended June 29, 1977.
121. Decree Law No. 422/1983.
122. Law of July 20, 1963; Decrees of Mar. 4, 1965, and Feb. 5, 1970 (currently being
reformed upon accession to EEC).
123. Competition Act (SFS 1982:79), entered into force on Jan. 1, 1983.
124. Law No. 85-1708 of Dec. 30, 1985; see Doing Business in Europe, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 23,001-23,027 (1986).
125. Id. 23,501-23,529 (Act against Restraints of Competition) (1957), as amended
(Germany has the most developed of the European competition laws).
FALL 1987
980 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
dom, 126 Canada, 127 Japan, 128 and Australia, 129 all have antitrust laws of
varying degrees and intensities. 130 Since economic effects are the focus
of antitrust and competition laws, the type of foreign representation-
agency as opposed to distributorship-is a secondary matter. In Europe,
community law and national laws overlap and quite complex compliance
issues can arise. Our discussion extends only to some important points
of Community law.
In the EEC agents are not exempt from scrutiny, though no principal loses
independence in the marketplace by virtue of the representation. Generally,
however, the legal developments in this area have concerned distributor-
ships. Under article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome a distributor may be pre-
vented from distributing competing goods and from actively soliciting
business in another EEC country, but the distributor may not be forbidden
from selling in that country. 13 1 "Absolute territorial protection" is not per-
mitted, and an agreement must be prepared to permit parallel imports. 132
126. Id. 24,001-24,030; Competition Act, 1980, c. 21; Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
1976, c. 34.
127. Competition Act, 1986, reprinted in 50 A.T.R.R. 1189 (1986). There is also significant
provincial legislation.
128. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade,
Act. No. 54 (1947) (as amended).
129. Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Act No. 51) (as amended) (closely modeled on U.S. law).
130. Latin and South American nations exhibit less developed antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
Cira, Observations on Current Developments in Restrictive Business Practice Control Leg-
islation in Latin America, 16 REVUE SwIss DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE
29 (1982); White, Recent Practices in Latin America, 3 U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.6/17 (1978).
131. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 297 U.N.T.S. 2; EEC Reg. No. 1983/83, 26 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983) (concerning distributorship agreements). The primary
purpose of art. 85(l) of the Rome Treaty is to prohibit "the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market." The agreements, however, must
affect trade and commerce between the member states to fall within' the purview of art.
85(1). See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1965, Landgericht (District Court), Mannheim. W. Ger., for
an examination of the requirements of art. 85(l). Such agreements may also include exclusive
distribution agreements for the resale of goods within a particular member state when both
parties to the agreement belong to that member state. While this arguably would occur only
in exceptional cases, Reg. 1983/83 would protect such agreements from the provisions of
art. 85(l) if the agreements affect trade between the member states and satisfy the other
mandatory requirements of the regulation. See Recital 3 of Regulation 83/83. The same
principal operates with respect to exclusive purchasing agreements under Reg. 1984/83.
132. Reg. 1983/83, art. 3(c). The distributor also may undertake the other express obli-
gations set forth in Reg. 1983/83, art. 2(3). A continuing tug of war exists between the
European Court of Justice and national courts on the permissibility of protections against
parallel imports. See, e.g., Bus. L. BRIEF (Financial Times), May 1984, at 12-13; Bus. L.
BRIEF (Financial Times), May 1985, at 13-14; Bus L. BRIEF (Financial Times), Nov. 1985,
at 3-5. For attempts by the EEC to harmonize the differing laws applicable to commercial
agents (not applicable to distributors), see Proposal of Dec. 17. 1976, Council Directive to
Coordinate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Commercial Agents, 20 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 13) 2 (1977), amended by Proposal of Jan. 29, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 56) 5 (1979). Since the Directive is largely based on continental civil law concepts,
the United Kingdom continues to oppose the Directive strongly.
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EEC antitrust law distinguishes between exclusive distributorship
arrangements 133 and exclusive purchasing arrangements. 134 Both types
are given a "block exemption" from enforcement under article 85(1) in
certain circumstances established by the Commission of the European
Communities. 135
Recently, the European Court of Justice took a hard line on territorial
restrictions in "distribution franchises." In the Pronuptia case 36 the court
struck down a franchise system that resulted in carving up of markets
between franchisor and franchisees. The Commission has responded to
the decision by commencing work on a block exemption for such franchises.
Most recently, the European Court of Justice has reinforced its op-
position to restrictions on parallel imports. ETA, the Swiss Manufacturer
of "Swatch" watches, sought to limit its product guarantee to watches
sold by a distributor within its territory. Customers who bought a Swatch
from a distributor for another territory were denied the guarantee. The
Court struck down the limitation as a void market distorting mechanism. 137
"Technical" standards may generally be imposed on a European rep-
resentative without violating article 85. The exporter may require the
distributor to offer after-sales service and technical expertise and to op-
133. EEC Comm. Reg. 1983/83 as of June 22, 1983 (on the application of art. 85(3) to
exclusive distributorship agreements), 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2730 (1985) (replacing EEC Comm. Reg. 67/67). The focus of Reg. 1983/
83 is clearly upon inter-brand competition.
134. EEC Comm. Reg. 1984/83 as of June 22, 1983 (on the application of art. 85(3) to
categories of exclusive purchasing agreements), 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983),
2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733 (1985). The focus of Reg. 1984/83 is clearly upon intra-
brand competition.
135. EEC Commission Notice Concerning Regs. No. 1983/83 and No. 1984/83 (on the
application of art. 85(3) to categories of exclusive distribution agreements and exclusive
purchasing agreements), 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 355) 7 (1983), reprinted in [1982-1985
Tranfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,548. Regulation 1983/83 applies only to the
anticompetitive provisions of an exclusive distribution agreement. It exempts from art. 85(1)
of the Treaty of Rome those arrangements between two "undertakings" (or economic
entities) when one party provides goods for resale within the common market only to the
other. Art. I of Reg. 1983/83. The exemption is available only in respect to agreements
pursuant to which goods are resold or leased, and is not available where goods are consumed
or incorporated into other products.
Certain restrictions may be imposed on either party to the exclusive distribution agreement
or the exclusive purchasing agreement. These permissible restrictions are exhaustive; im-
position of additional restrictions would result in loss of the benefit to be gained from either
regulation. This is particularly so when the agreements limit the exclusive distributor or the
exclusive reseller in his choice of customers or restrict his freedom to determine his prices
and conditions of sale. See Recital 8 of both regulations.
136. Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,245 (1986), criticized in Bus. L. BRIEF (Financial
Times), Feb. 1986, at 5.
137. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 558, at 1-3 (July 31, 1986).
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erate in normal business hours, 138 but where service standards are used
to prevent discounters negotiating for the distributorship, the standards
will violate article 85(1), because they are in reality anticompetitive price
floor restrictions. 139 For arrangements that impact less than five percent
of a product market and anticipate sales of less than 200 million ECUs,
the Commission's "de minimis" rule applies. 140
The noncompetition provision should be carefully limited in time and
scope so as not to be oppressive. An overly oppressive noncompetition
clause will be disfavored by national courts and may result in an increase
of termination damages.
29. PRICE CONTROLS AND ANTIDUMPING PROBLEMS
If all of the foregoing considerations to be kept in mind in formulating
international representation agreements are not yet enough, the interna-
tional lawyer must also consider the impact that local price controls may
have on his client's business. Many developing countries have imple-
mented such laws, often in response to pressures from the International
Monetary Fund. Thus, the exporter must be most careful in establishing
the initial pricing of his products, and often the popular unilateral price
adjustments clause will not pass muster. 141 Antidumping laws of the local
jurisdiction must also be taken into account. 142 Borrowing from the GATT,
local laws generally prohibit the importation of goods at less than normal
value. While the agreement itself is not an effective tool to deal with
antidumping problems, the international lawyer should certainly address
this concern with his client.
V. Conclusion
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, even though an inter-
national representation agreement often is not approached with the same
respect as a sexy international joint venture agreement, it deserves careful
138. Demo Studio Schmidt v. Commission, 1984 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 63 (1984).
139. AEG Telefunken A.G. v. Commission, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 325 (1984); see also The
Agreement of AEG-Telefunken, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 117) 15 (1982), reprinted in 2
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 386 (1982).
140. The Commission takes the view that, given the foregoing criteria, representation
will not have an appreciable effect on competition and therefore will not violate art. 85(1).
Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 50 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 64) 1 (1970),
amended Dec. 19, 1977. For the amended version, see Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,815.
141. United States agencies such as the office of the Trade Representative and the De-
partment of Commerce can be very helpful in early identification of potential problems in
this area.
142. Additionally, the United States exporter should allow for costs of import licensing
in setting prices.
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scrutiny, because a whole host of laws (including United States and foreign
laws, as well as transnational treaties and conventions) and business con-
siderations must be taken into account in order to maximize the client's
hopes of achieving his long-term commercial objectives. While the United
States counsel can (and clearly should) be most helpful in anticipating
potential foreign legal and business concerns, the recommended use of
competent local counsel cannot be overemphasized. Local customs and
methods of doing business, valuable local contacts, and a continuing local
independent source of information are key to the success of an interna-
tional representation agreement. Competent local counsel can often con-
stitute a valuable business asset in helping to build an exporter's overseas
relationships. At the least, local counsel is necessary to advise on local
laws and practices. Country-by-country analyses are essential because no
two jurisdictions are the same.
The cornerstone of all international arrangements must be one of mutual
trust in order to maximize the success of the undertaking; but all the trust
in the world won't help before a tribunal asked to interpret a long forgotten
and ignored written agreement. If a distributorship agreement is negotiated
and signed, but the parties refer to the foreign representative as "their
agent," and then begin to treat him as such, it would greatly surprise us
if the tribunal asked to resolve a dispute would not also treat the repre-
sentative as an agent, and accord him all of the protections the foreign
agency law confers.
The mutual trust on which an international arrangement must be built
is ephemeral when the contractual provisions are unreasonable and ov-
erreaching. Aside from the uncertainty as to validity and enforceability
that such provisions create, they can cause irreparable harm to the mutual
trust that the client has painstakingly sought to establish. Once a foreign
representative has been unfavorably impacted by unreasonable provi-
sions, it will be difficult for the parties to expect good faith as a guide in
their continuing commercial relationship or, if disputes arise, to facilitate
negotiations leading to settlement or resolution. The authors hope that
this article will convince international lawyers to structure transactions
in a reasonable and fair manner for the purpose of enhancing and facili-
tating their clients' long-term business objectives and creating some de-
gree of heightened international goodwill, and to help maintain the ongoing
viability of the structure established.
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( The Institute for Transnational Arbitration
1SCOREBOARD
of
ADHERENCE TO TRANSNATIONAL ARBITRATION TREATIES (as of July 1,1987)
NY. UN Arbitration Lonvention of 1958. Syols ftr adherene status are explaird at ,rnd f table.
ICSID Con ntion on the Settlement of Invnestrrert Disputes of 1965.
MIGA non tion Estabiihin the Multilateral Invstment Gunaratee Changes since April 1, 1987:
Agency ot 1985. Turkey signed ICSID Conn tion on June -4, iWK.
I/A = Itter-American Conventior on International Conmmercial Arbitration 'lao contriesigned1G MI C n.entio.n Stad gs aron Ma, 7,1987 and S n.,,,.
of 1975. m April 2, 1987.
USBIT = U S. Bilateral Intrasent Iteatnis. 'lm. countries ratified MtA Convention: Japan n June. 51987 and Malawi
OPIC Agreements upporting programus of U.S. Oserea Private am May 14.1987.
rnestrnent Corporation. ahrain ratified OPIC.






Anguilla3  R R S R
Antigua and Barbuda NP R
Argentina S R
Aruba4  R R S R
Australia R S
Austria R R 10
Bahamas R
Bahrain R R
Bangladesh R R S R
Barbados R R R
Belgium R R 1O
Belize S R
Benin R R S R
Bhutan
Bolivia S R




Burkina Faso R R R
Burma
Burundi R NP R
Byelorussian SSR R
Cambodia (Kampuchea) R
Cameroon R S R
Canada R S.
Cape Verde R
Central African Republic R R R
Chad R R
Chile R S R R
China (People's Republic) R NP R
Colombia R S R R
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Nation N.Yg ICSID MIGA I/A USBIT OPIC
Comoros R
Congo R R
Cook Islands5  R
Costa Rica S S R NP R
Cuba R 10
Cyprus R R R R
Czechoslovakia R




Ecuador R R R S R
Egypt R R S S R
El Salvador S R R R
Equatorial Guinea S R
Ethiopia S R
Fiji R S R
Finland R R 10
France R R S 10
French Guiana6  R R S R
Gabon R NP R
Gambia R R
German Democratic Republic R
Germany, Federal Republic R R S* 10
Ghana R R S R
Greece R R S R
Grenada S S R




Haiti R S S R
Holy See (Vatican City) R
Honduras S R NP. R
Hungary R R S
Iceland R
India R R
Indonesia R R R NP R
Iran 10
Iraq NP
Ireland R R S. 10
Israel R R R
Italy R R S* 10
Ivory Coast R S R
Jamaica R S R
Japan R R R*
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Nation N.Y ICSID MIGA I/A USBIT OPIC
Korea (Democratic People's Republic)
Korea (Republic) R R S R
Kuwait R R S NP
Laos 10
Lebanon R




Luxembourg R R 10
Madagascar R R S R
Malawi R R R













Netherlands R R S. 10
Netherlands Antilles' R R S R
New Zealand R R
Nicaragua S R
Niger R R R
Nigeria R R S R
Norway R R 10
Oman R
Pakistan S R R R
Panama R R S R
Papua New Guinea R R
Paraguay R R R
Peru 10




Romania R R R
Rwanda R NP R
St. Christopher & Nevis S R
St. Lucia R S R
St. Vincent & Grenadines R
San Marino R
Sao bme e Principe R
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Nation N.Y ICSID MIGA I/A USBIT OPIC
Saudi Arabia R R R
Senegal R R S R
Seychelles R
Sierra Leone R S R
Singapore R R R




SriLanka R R S NP R
Sudan R S R
Suriname NP
Swaziland R R
Sweden R R S.




Thailand R S R
Togo R S R
Tonga R
Trinidad and Tobago R R R
Tlnisia R R S R




Union of Soviet Socialist Republics R
United Arab Emirates R NP
United Kingdom R R S* 10
United States of America R R S* S N/A N/A




Western Samoa R R R
Yemen Arab Republic S R
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic
Yugoslavia R R R
Zaire R S S R
Zambia R S R
Zimbabwe NP
Notes: It) Not in force. Enters into force upon ratification (") by five capital-exporting and fifteen capital importing countries if total subscriptions amount to at least
one third of ifGAN capital. Asterisk (*) after symbol indicates capital exporting country per Schedule A to the Conoention. (2) A bilateral investment treaty wif fin listed
as being ratified only when it has been ratified by both signatories. 13) Dependency of United Kingdom. (4) Autonomous part of the Netherlands. 15) Under New Zealand
sovereignty (6) Overseas Department of France. (7) Autonomous part of the Netherlands.
Symbols: Sources:
S: Signed but not ratified N&N from ITA, July 1986; Bulletin of the U.S. Department of State, May 1986 to May 1987;
R: Ratified or acceded telegram of July 6, 1987, from Dr. Gerold Herrmann, UN Office of Legal Affairs in Vienna; and
NP: Negotiations pending interviews June 29 to July 10, 1987, with Dr. Christina, Hoedemaker, Mr. Paul Levine and Mr. Antonio
1O: Inoperable Parra, World Bank; Ms. Lois Alldet and Mr. John Zylman, 'Ieaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser,
N/A: Not applicable U.S. Department ofState; Mrs. Eliana P Vela, 'Ieaty Officer, Organization of American States; and Mr.
Lorin Weisenfeld, Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
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